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INFORMATION PRIVACY IN AN AGE OF 
INVISIBLE SHOPPER TRACKING: WHO WILL 
PAY THE PRICE FOR STORES OF THE FUTURE? 
Kristin Harripaul 
ABSTRACT 
Explosive growth in technology has brought a unique opportunity 
to the doors of brick-and-mortar retail—a nearly $3.38 trillion 
industry struggling to regain relevance among modern, digitally 
enabled shoppers. Specifically, in-store analytics, or shopper 
tracking technologies, are allowing these retailers to better compete 
with online stores by tapping into consumer data unprecedented in 
the brick-and-mortar context. With these technologies, stores now 
have access to detailed metrics, like consumer dwell times, journeys, 
product engagement, product views, and demographic data such as 
age and gender, which can be used to optimize store operations and 
marketing and promotions. 
Recent events, however, including a string of data breaches and 
the passage of strict privacy laws in Europe and California, have 
renewed efforts for broad information privacy reform that could have 
deleterious consequences for these technologies. This Note examines 
the current state of privacy law; two approaches to information 
privacy reform that appeared before the 116th Congress, namely 
consumer control and business accountability; and the potential 
impact of these two regulatory approaches on in-store analytics 
technologies. It concludes that properly balancing consumer privacy 
and business interests through regulation requires more than a 
one-size-fits-all federal band-aid. Instead, it proposes starting with 
targeted federal acts aimed at the bigger gaps and outliers in existing 
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information privacy law, like brick-and-mortar technologies. 
Addressing in-store analytics, specifically, it recommends federal 
regulation focused on business-accountability and expanded FTC 
powers, and it outlines specific considerations for a targeted act. 
 
2
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 10
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss3/10
2021] INFORMATION PRIVACY 1079 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 1080 
I. BACKGROUND.......................................................................... 1084 
A. In-Store Tracking and Related Privacy Concerns ............ 1087 
B. Protections Under Current Privacy Laws ........................ 1089 
II. ANALYSIS ................................................................................ 1094 
A. The Current Notice-and-Choice Regime .......................... 1097 
1. FTC “Common Law” ................................................. 1098 
2. Implications for Brick-and-Mortar ............................. 1100 
B. Moving Beyond Notice-and-Choice .................................. 1101 
1. Consumer Control Approach ...................................... 1102 
2. Business Accountability Approach ............................. 1106 
III. PROPOSAL ................................................................................ 1108 
A. A Uniform Privacy Landscape .......................................... 1109 
B. A Targeted Brick-and-Mortar Technology Privacy Act ... 1111 
C. More Business Accountability and FTC Enforcement ...... 1113 
D. Specific Brick-and-Mortar Considerations ...................... 1116 
1. Fixed, Narrow Definition of PII ................................. 1116 
2. General Duty of Care ................................................. 1118 
3. Reasonable Consumer Control ................................... 1119 
4. Notice Through 21st Century Technology .................. 1120 





Published by Reading Room, 2021
1080 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2019, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) made history by 
imposing a record-breaking $5 billion civil penalty on social media 
giant Facebook for privacy-related violations.1 According to the FTC, 
the penalty “is one of the largest penalties ever assessed by the U.S. 
government for any violation” and is “almost [twenty] times greater 
than the largest privacy or data security penalty ever imposed 
worldwide.”2 But what even warranted such action, and why are 
some policymakers saying that the settlement, which includes a 
twenty-year agreement for independent privacy oversight, still was 
not severe enough?3 The answer lies at the heart of a privacy debate 
that has been brewing in the United States for decades, a debate that 
grows more complex in an increasingly digital world.4 
 
 1. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy 
Restrictions on Facebook (July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-
imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-new-privacy-restrictions [https://perma.cc/CMU4-EVD7]; Lesley 
Fair, FTC’s $5 Billion Facebook Settlement: Record-Breaking and History-Making, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N: BUS. BLOG (July 24, 2019, 8:52 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-
blog/2019/07/ftcs-5-billion-facebook-settlement-record-breaking-history [https://perma.cc/Q5DB-
RS6D]; Michael Nuñez, FTC Slaps Facebook with $5 Billion Fine, Forces New Privacy Controls, 
FORBES (July 24, 2019, 12:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mnunez/2019/07/24/ftcs-
unprecedented-slap-fines-facebook-5-billion-forces-new-privacy-controls/#3871ada05668. 
 2. Press Release, supra note 1. 
 3. See, e.g., Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra at 2, 16, In re Facebook, Inc., No. 
182-3109, 2019 WL 3451729, at *2, *16 (F.T.C. July 24, 2019) [hereinafter Dissenting Statement of 
Commissioner Chopra] (noting that the settlement established a “disappointing precedent” and 
essentially offered “blanket immunity for unspecified violations by Facebook and its executives,” and 
that the penalty, although “record-breaking,” did not exceed Facebook’s gains); Dissenting Statement of 
Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter at 1, 15–16, 19, In re Facebook, Inc., No. 182-3109 (F.T.C. July 24, 
2019) [hereinafter Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Slaughter], 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1536918/182_3109_slaughter_statement
_on_facebook_7-24-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G8E-6VED] (emphasizing that the injunctive relief the 
FTC chose was unlikely to deter Facebook from future violations given that the injunction neither 
changed Facebook’s fundamental business model nor held Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg personally 
liable, despite signs that the company started violating its original 2012 FTC consent order “early and 
often”). 
 4. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF 
SOCIAL LIFE 36–37 (2010) (explaining that increasing technological capabilities fueled information 
privacy debates on the “increasing and potentially unlimited uses of computerized databases of personal 
information” as early as the 1960s and 1970s); see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Archive of the Meetings of 
the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems (SACAPDS): The Origin of 
Fair Information Practices, BERKELEY L., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/research/bclt/research/privacy-
at-bclt/archive-of-the-meetings-of-the-secretarys-advisory-committee-on-automated-personal-data-
systems-sacapds/ [https://perma.cc/6AMM-R2RZ] (reading 1973 transcripts from the committee that 
4
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For a long time, information privacy concerns have focused on 
cyberspace—social media and e-commerce.5 But now, a new wave of 
connected technologies and inexpensive forms of data storage are 
bringing these concerns to the doors of brick-and-mortar stores, an 
industry under particular pressure to transform and regain relevance 
among digitally enabled shoppers.6 Specifically, growth in in-store 
analytics—or shopper-tracking technologies, which monitor 
shoppers’ movements in-store via mechanisms such as video 
analytics and mobile tracking—is quickly erasing differences 
between how precisely shoppers can be tracked online and inside a 
physical store.7 
 
delivered the principles underlying modern privacy legislation and observing that “it is striking how 
little conversations about privacy have changed in forty years”); Tehilla Shwartz Altshuler, Privacy in a 
Digital World, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 26, 2019, 5:00 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/26/privacy-
queen-of-human-rights-in-a-digital-world (explaining how technological progress has caused tension 
“between the right to privacy and the extensive data pooling on which the digital economy is based”). 
For a more recent example of this tension, consider the outrage surrounding use of Clearview AI’s facial 
recognition technology to support law enforcement efforts and contact tracing after the COVID-19 
pandemic. Jacob Ward & Chiara Sottile, A Facial Recognition Company Wants to Help with Contact 
Tracing. A Senator Has Questions., NBC NEWS (Apr. 30, 2020, 9:29 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/facial-recognition-company-wants-help-contact-tracing-
senator-has-questions-n1197291 [https://perma.cc/TZ8G-5EJH]. 
 5. John D. McKinnon, Big Brother at the Mall, WALL ST. J.: BUS. (Apr. 13, 2019, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-brother-in-the-mall-11555128005 [https://perma.cc/LQ3V-SXGX]. 
 6. Id.; Altshuler, supra note 4; Lisa Terry, Shopper Tracking: Reinventing and Reimagining the 
Store Experience, RIS NEWS (May 31, 2019), https://risnews.com/shopper-tracking-reinventing-and-
reimagining-store-experience [https://perma.cc/VS9P-S8ER] (“Innovations in cameras, sensors, RFID, 
mobile, edge computing and networking technologies are giving retailers new insight . . . .”). See 
generally Ronny Max, 19 Technologies of People Tracking, BEHAV. ANALYTICS RETAIL (Jan. 27, 
2021), https://behavioranalyticsretail.com/technologies-tracking-people/ (explaining how brick-and-
mortar technologies are becoming more cost-effective and accurate in real-time); Drew FitzGerald, 5G 
Race Could Leave Personal Privacy in the Dust, WALL ST. J.: BUS. (Nov. 11, 2019, 10:00 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/5g-race-could-leave-personal-privacy-in-the-dust-11573527600 
[https://perma.cc/54PZ-L6TH] (“[N]ew 5G networks are expected to bring billions of cameras, sensors 
and other ‘smart’ devices . . . . [online, all collecting] reams of data from the world around them . . . .”). 
Retail is not the only industry affected by technology growth and adoption—smart cities, smart vehicles, 
and smart factories are all in the works. Vasanth Ganesan et al., Video Meets the Internet of Things, 
MCKINSEY & CO. (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/technology-media-and-
telecommunications/our-insights/video-meets-the-internet-of-things [https://perma.cc/5SWD-X6T8]; 
see also Melissa Locker, Facial Recognition Is Coming to Hotels to Make Check-In Easier—and Much 
Creepier, FAST CO. (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90327875/facial-recognition-is-
coming-to-hotels-to-make-check-in-easier-and-much-creepier (describing an ultra-modern boutique 
hotel in China that lets guests “scan their faces to expedite the [check-in] process”; make requests 
through an “Alexa-like assistant” that controls the temperature, curtains, and lights; and receive room 
service deliveries and bar drinks via robots). 
 7. McKinnon, supra note 5; see also Max, supra note 6 (detailing nineteen different 
5
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For shoppers, the promise of these tracking technologies is a 
tailored and convenient shopping experience that is more consistent 
with their online experiences.8 However, the premise of in-store 
tracking has left some consumer advocates, academics, and key 
committee leaders in both the House and Senate uneasy.9 This 
uneasiness is further underscored by the fact that these tracking 
technologies are often invisible to the average shopper.10 Despite 
these concerns, however, no uniform information privacy law 
exists—U.S. privacy law has remained largely self-regulatory and 
sectoral, unlike many industrialized nations that protect personal data 
in an omnibus fashion.11 An array of “constitutional protections, 
federal and state statutes, torts, regulatory rules, and treaties” regulate 
different industries and economic sectors, leaving gaping holes with 
little recourse for these new technology-driven problems.12 
 
shopper-tracking mechanisms available in 2020). Video analytics is the use of video sensors placed in 
stores to collect insights on the shopper—including demographics, in-store journeys, aisle dynamics, 
category performance, and display optimization, among other metrics—to optimize in-store 
performance. VideoMining Frequently Asked Questions, VIDEOMINING [hereinafter VideoMining], 
http://www.videomining.com/newsroom/articles-white-papers/videomining-frequently-asked-questions 
[https://perma.cc/HQ9K-M7L4]; see also Max, supra note 6. In contrast, mobile analytics, such as 
Wi-Fi analytics, listens for signals from the shopper’s mobile device to detect presence in-store and 
captures location data, among other metrics, to optimize in-store performance. WALKBASE, WI-FI 
ANALYTICS FOR RETAIL STORES: BUYER’S GUIDE 11 (2016), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/wlkbase/Whitepapers/whitepaper-walkbase-wifi-analytics-buyers-guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GQ3D-SC99]. 
 8. BRP, UNIFIED COMMERCE SURVEY 3 (2019) (finding that 87% of surveyed consumers indicated 
an interest in a “personalized and consistent experience across all channels”). 
 9. McKinnon, supra note 5; see also Daniel Keyes, New In-Store Technologies Could Bring About 
Stricter Regulations, BUS. INSIDER: RETAIL (Apr. 16, 2019, 10:25 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/new-in-store-technologies-may-bring-regulations-2019-4 
[https://perma.cc/69ET-ZTYT]; Ashkan Soltani, Privacy Trade-Offs in Retail Tracking, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N: TECH@FTC (Apr. 30, 2015, 11:59 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/techftc/2015/04/privacy-trade-offs-retail-tracking [https://perma.cc/WP5N-FCAE] 
(describing the “obscure” and “controversial” nature of retail tracking and noting consumer distrust with 
the technology). 
 10. See FitzGerald, supra note 6 (explaining that “[p]eople know that they’re being tracked online” 
but do not realize that the same applies in-store (quoting Pankaj Srivastava, chief operating officer of 
FigLeaf App Inc.)); see also Soltani, supra note 9; Stephanie Thien Hang Nguyen, What the First 
Porta-Potty Can Teach Designers About Digital Privacy, FAST CO. (Sept. 27, 2019), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/90409598/what-the-first-porta-potty-can-teach-designers-about-digital-
privacy [https://perma.cc/K7QS-X5H2] (“Without sights, sounds, and touch, [data privacy] feels 
practically invisible.”). 
 11. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014). 
 12. Id. (“There is a law for video records and a different law for cable records. The Health Insurance 
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Historically, efforts to create a broad information privacy 
framework governing how businesses collect, use, share, and protect 
personal information have struggled to gain traction.13 But on the 
heels of the strict online privacy rules established by the 2018 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the European Union 
(EU) and the 2019 California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), 
privacy advocates and business groups alike are now calling on 
Congress to create some uniformity amid a growing patchwork of 
privacy standards.14 Oddly, despite brick-and-mortar’s control over 
the majority of consumer sales, its technologies often figure little into 
narrow, online-focused privacy rhetoric or legislation, and what little 
guidance does exist leans toward treating online and 
brick-and-mortar tracking the same.15 
 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) protects the privacy of health data, but a different regime 
governs the privacy of financial data. In fact, there are several laws that regulate financial data 
depending on the industry, and health data is not even uniformly protected . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
 13. Allison Grande, What to Watch As Congress Mulls Federal Privacy Legislation, LAW360 (Feb. 
25, 2019, 9:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1132337/what-to-watch-as-congress-mulls-
federal-privacy-legislation; see also Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game 
Today—and How to Change the Game, BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-how-to-
change-the-game/ (inferring that multinational corporations and business interests have long posed a 
roadblock to uniform privacy law development, given little incentive and a daunting outlook on dealing 
with comprehensive law); Natasha Singer, Why a Push for Online Privacy Is Bogged Down in 
Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/29/technology/obamas-
effort-on-consumer-privacy-falls-short-critics-say.html [https://perma.cc/4MVB-T3KH] (providing an 
illustrative example of how online privacy initiatives have been subject to “gridlock” due to “clashing 
visions for American society and commerce” and noting that it “provides an instructive preview of 
looming battles . . . to come”). 
 14. Grande, supra note 13 (“The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Internet Association and BSA: 
The Software Alliance, along with tech giants such as Google, Microsoft and Apple, are among the 
stakeholders in the business community that have recently thrown their support 
behind . . . uniform . . . privacy rules, with several offering up their own proposed frameworks.”). 
 15. JOSEPH TUROW, THE AISLES HAVE EYES: HOW RETAILERS TRACK YOUR SHOPPING, STRIP 
YOUR PRIVACY, AND DEFINE YOUR POWER 8 (2017) (“Oddly, although these [in-store tracking] 
practices relate to the ongoing and widespread public discussion about privacy . . . retailers only barely 
figure in the debate. The shopping aisle has, in fact, received almost no attention even among 
academics.”); see also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., CB20-24, QUARTERLY RETAIL 
E-COMMERCE SALES 4TH QUARTER 2019, at 2 tbl.1 (2020) (noting that brick-and-mortar sales 
accounted for approximately 89% of total retail sales in 2019); David F. McDowell et al., What the 
Nomi Case Could Mean for Retail Tracking, LAW360 (May 19, 2015, 10:10 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/655958/what-the-nomi-case-could-mean-for-retail-tracking (noting 
that based on the FTC’s first settlement against a retail tracking company, “it is reasonable to anticipate 
that the FTC will move in a direction that mirrors its position with respect to online tracking . . . .”). 
7
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As such, in-store tracking technologies could be one of the first 
casualties of new privacy reform laws, hampering the 
brick-and-mortar retailer’s ability to compete in an increasingly 
complex and digital world.16 The following Note discusses how 
policymakers should address shopper-tracking practices in 
brick-and-mortar amidst prompts for privacy reform. Part I examines 
key in-store tracking practices and concerns and the current state of 
privacy law. Part II analyzes various bills and proposals, from 
privacy advocates and business groups alike, for privacy reform. Part 
III proposes specific considerations to balance privacy rights against 
support for the next phase of brick-and-mortar innovation—the store 
of the future. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Over the last decade, explosive growth in technology has changed 
the rules of engagement, providing businesses with access to massive 
pools of data across almost every aspect of consumers’ lives.17 These 
technologies have built a rich digital economy and left a trail of 
electronic breadcrumbs that businesses, under competitive pressures, 
are driven to turn into profit.18 Furthermore, in an intriguing paradox, 
 
 16. Keyes, supra note 9 (“Any future regulations dealing with in-store data privacy will likely 
hamper physical retailers’ ability to provide a personalized and convenient shopping experience. If 
retailers’ ability to identify and track consumers in-store is restricted, they may struggle to personalize 
in-store shopping.”); see also McKinnon, supra note 5 (“[Privacy legislation is] drawing concern from 
traditional retailers who worry that their cutting-edge technologies could be banned or disrupted if they 
are included under the privacy law.”). 
 17. Altshuler, supra note 4; Bruce Schneier, Fear and Convenience, in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN 
AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 200, 202 (Marc Rotenberg et al. eds., 2015) (“Ephemeral 
conversation is becoming increasingly rare . . . .”). See generally Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We 
Create Every Day? The Mind-Blowing Stats Everyone Should Read, FORBES (May 21, 2018, 12:42 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-much-data-do-we-create-every-day-
the-mind-blowing-stats-everyone-should-read/#1baf020260ba [https://perma.cc/7CWE-EWZL] 
(providing several statistics on the volume and categories of consumer data collected each day); Dylan 
Curran, Opinion, Are You Ready? Here Is All the Data Facebook and Google Have on You, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2018, 3:17 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/28/all-
the-data-facebook-google-has-on-you-privacy [https://perma.cc/94Z3-7BUC] (illustrating the level of 
personal information companies like Google and Facebook collect on users). 
 18. See Jeff Jonas, The Surveillance Society and Transparent You (explaining that organizations of 
all shapes and sizes must have access to more information and make sense of it if they hope to survive), 
in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS, supra note 17, at 93, 94; see also Press 
8
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consumers have been willing contributors to this digital economy 
despite mistrusting companies that monitor their behavior.19 They 
confess their problems on social media, allow apps to track their 
mobile location, and welcome an increasing number of smart 
technologies into their lives in exchange for convenience and other 
value.20 As a result, industry experts estimate that this digital 
economy is “doubling the volume of . . . information in the world 
every two years.”21 
This nonstop disruption has shaken up the very foundation of 
retail, “creating opportunities for new entrants, and making 
transformation an imperative for [brick-and-mortar] incumbents” that 
are sorely ill-prepared for this digitally enhanced marketplace.22 
 
Release, Gartner, Gartner Says 8.4 Billion Connected “Things” Will Be in Use in 2017, Up 31 Percent 
from 2016 (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2017-02-07-gartner-
says-8-billion-connected-things-will-be-in-use-in-2017-up-31-percent-from-2016 
[https://perma.cc/W63K-6RUK] (forecasting that approximately 12.8 billion consumer-connected 
devices would be in use in 2020, more than doubling the estimated 5.2 billion devices in use three years 
prior). 
 19. See Brooke Auxier et al., Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of 
Control over Their Personal Information, PEW RSCH. CTR.: INTERNET & TECH. (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-and-
feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/ [https://perma.cc/EJC7-FQJK] (“[A] majority 
of Americans report being concerned about the way their data is being used by companies (79%) . . . .”); 
see also Tal Z. Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
157, 162 (2019) (highlighting that “contrary to several surveys indicating a consumer preference toward 
privacy,” consumers’ “constant tendency to waive their data-related rights” indicates a disinterest in 
control and that consumers’ preferences and interests lie elsewhere). 
 20. See Angus Hervey, Privacy Shouldn’t Be the Price of Progress. Here’s How to Keep Your Data 
Safe, QUARTZ (Jan. 26, 2018), https://qz.com/1188898/privacy-shouldnt-be-the-price-of-progress-heres-
how-to-keep-your-data-safe/ [https://perma.cc/BV4Z-JK5M]; see also Press Release, supra note 18; 
Schneier, supra note 17, at 201–02. See generally Jonas, supra note 18. 
 21. Kerry, supra note 13. 
 22. ROD SIDES & BRYAN FURMAN, DELOITTE, 2019 RETAIL OUTLOOK: TRANSITION AHEAD 4 
(2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/consumer-business/us-cb-retail-
outlook-transition-ahead-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8FN-ZH5L]; Hugo Moreno, How Retailers Can 
Make the Most of Their Data, FORBES (June 28, 2018, 1:03 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesinsights/2018/06/28/how-retailers-can-make-the-most-of-their-
data/#6b2dd99d453c (“Among the industries that have seen their traditional ways of doing business 
upended by the rapid advent of the internet . . . , retail is perhaps one of the most affected. . . . [I]t’s now 
increasingly difficult for midsize retailers to remain competitive against the ubiquity and scale of global 
online marketplaces while margins dwindle and the costs of meeting customer expectations only 
continue to rise.”); Jack Karsten & Darrell M. West, Technology Adoption Powers Shift in Retail 
Landscape, BROOKINGS: TECHTANK (May 10, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/05/10/technology-adoption-powers-shift-in-retail-
landscape/ [https://perma.cc/W772-ZJAQ] (“To stay competitive with online retailers going forward, 
traditional retailers must match their pace of innovation.”); Corinne Ruff, Do Retailers Need Innovation 
9
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Modern shoppers—with increased access to information and growing 
expectations—have created a nightmare of a moving target for 
traditional retail stores that rely on limited transactional and loyalty 
data with little visibility into shopper behavior and what shoppers 
actually experience inside the physical environment.23 Additionally, 
because extracting insight from these traditional sources has minimal 
effect on daily decision making, brick-and-mortar retailers have little 
means to control their bottom line by adjusting and improving the 
shopping experience in real-time.24 
As such, analysts believe the retail industry is at “a major 
inflection point.”25 Unsurprisingly, brick-and-mortar “retailers are 
increasingly turning to data and analytics,” with shopper-tracking 
being the number one technology on retailers’ list of 
technology-enabled growth strategies for 2021.26 With everything to 
lose, brick-and-mortar is now looking to join the race to turn shopper 
data into a meaningful business advantage before online players 
 
Labs to Stay Alive?, RETAIL DIVE: DEEP DIVE (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.retaildive.com/news/do-
retailers-need-innovation-labs-to-stay-alive/440277/ (“Many retailers today are scrambling to keep pace 
with emerging technologies and changing consumer behaviors. Everyone is trying to create stores of the 
future . . . .”). 
 23. See SHOPPER TECH. INST., DIGITAL DISRUPTION IN CPG & RETAIL loc. 198 (2018) (ebook) 
(“Current analytical models based on spend data only with limited customer information are unable to 
predict shopper interests and purchases.”); see also Karsten & West, supra note 22 (explaining how 
online retailers “can gather customer data with every click and then rapidly redesign their website to 
boost sales, [while] brick-and-mortar stores might only track final purchases”); Rajeev Sharma, 
Adapting to the New Cherry-Picking Shopper, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2014, 7:57 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/it-wont-be-easy-making-money-off-of-cherry-picking-shoppers-
1416877025 [https://perma.cc/Z3K4-MYFC] (explaining how modern, cherry-picking shoppers are 
“spoiled for choice” and “won’t be very lucrative unless stores adapt”); VideoMining, supra note 7 
(discussing the limits on the sales and loyalty card data brick-and-mortar already holds). 
 24. Terry, supra note 6 (describing the store floor as a “previously data-dark place”); see also 
RETAILWIRE RSCH., HOW SHOPPER INSIGHTS ARE FUELING RETAIL PROGRESS 2 (2014) (finding that 
84% of brick-and-mortar incumbents describe themselves as “newbies” and “getting there” in 
harnessing their data); SIDES & FURMAN, supra note 22, at 14 (“For years, the industry struggled with 
how to create and use data.”). See generally Jia Wertz, Why Brick and Mortar Retailers Need 
E-Commerce-Style Data Tracking Methods, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2017, 5:15 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jiawertz/2017/12/18/brick-and-mortar-retailers-need-e-commerce-style-
data-tracking/#7f562f9280eb [https://perma.cc/U9D9-3RVZ] (indicating that brick-and-mortar data has 
been very difficult to access and turn into actionable insight for use in daily decision-making processes). 
 25. SIDES & FURMAN, supra note 22, at 3; see also Max, supra note 6. 
 26. Moreno, supra note 22; see also JOE SKORUPA, RIS NEWS, 29TH ANNUAL RETAIL TECHNOLOGY 
STUDY: RETAIL ACCELERATES 16 fig.4 (2019), https://risnews.com/29th-annual-retail-technology-
study-retail-accelerates. 
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render stores obsolete.27 Despite a general lack of agility, budgetary 
barriers, and legacy system integration problems, already 11% of 
retail stores have adopted in-store tracking technologies, and 41% 
plan to invest in shopper tracking capabilities for 2021.28 
A. In-Store Tracking and Related Privacy Concerns 
The desire to collect data on shoppers is not a new practice; 
retailers have been doing it for decades.29 But now, retailers like 
Walmart, Target, Macy’s, Nordstrom, Cabela’s, and many more are 
building stores of the future and gathering new categories of 
consumer behavioral data through a variety of methods.30 
In particular, retail stores are beginning to tap into data 
unprecedented in the brick-and-mortar context, with in-store tracking 
technologies, like video and mobile analytics that monitor consumers 
through the use of video and cellphone signals.31 With these 
technologies, physical stores have access to many of the analytics 
already available to online stores, including traffic counts, in-store 
journeys, product engagement, products viewed, dwell times, and 
demographic data such as gender and age range.32 These metrics can 
be used to optimize layout and store planning, staffing and 
merchandising, and marketing and promotions.33 
 
 27. Jonas, supra note 18; see also SIDES & FURMAN, supra note 22; SKORUPA, supra note 26; 
Moreno, supra note 22. 
 28. SKORUPA, supra note 26, at 14 fig.2, 18. Some online players are also making plans including 
in-store tracking technologies—retail behemoth Amazon is planning to open 3,000 cashierless stores 
built on a mix of tracking and other technologies across the U.S. by 2021. Rani Molla, Amazon’s 
Cashierless Go Stores Could Be a $4 Billion Business by 2021, New Research Suggests, VOX (Jan. 4, 
2019, 10:33 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/1/4/18166934/amazon-go-stores-revenue-estimates-
cashierless. 
 29. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?_r=1&ref=charlesduhigg 
[https://perma.cc/F2TU-BSGP]. 
 30. TUROW, supra note 15, at 3; Stephanie Clifford & Quentin Hardy, Attention, Shoppers: Store Is 
Tracking Your Cell, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/business/attention-shopper-stores-are-tracking-your-cell.html 
[https://perma.cc/S5LB-RSZ2]. 
 31. See, e.g., Clifford & Hardy, supra note 30 (highlighting the use of video and mobile tracking to 
learn gender, time spent in certain aisles, and time spent looking at specific merchandise); see also 
Terry, supra note 6. 
 32. McKinnon, supra note 5; Terry, supra note 6; Max, supra note 6. 
 33. Terry, supra note 6; Anne Stephen, Finding the ROI in Retail In-Store Analytics, STREET FIGHT 
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The type of data collected from these tracking devices varies from 
one solution and provider to the next, but generally, the data 
collected is labeled as either personal information, also known as 
personally identifiable information (PII), or nonidentifiable 
information.34 PII is commonly used to describe information that 
uniquely identifies a shopper, typically by name, whereas 
nonidentifiable information does not identify the shopper and is not 
considered linkable to that specific shopper.35 Notably, these neat 
labels often offer a fictitious distinction given the “messiness” and 
“malleable nature” of big data and the fact that nonidentifiable data 
can increasingly be reidentified as technology advances.36 
In brick-and-mortar, as well as online, the ability to aggregate 
different data sets and thereby generate additional consumer 
information beyond the limits of provided data sets is a key concern 
with tracking technologies.37 The idea is that, under the guise of 
promised benefits like “convenience,” companies aggregate 
expansive amounts of consumer data to construct precise personality, 
psychological, and behavioral profiles in an effort to automate buying 
behavior and essentially erode personal choice.38 
 
(Jan. 5, 2015), https://streetfightmag.com/2015/01/05/finding-the-roi-in-retail-in-store-
analytics/#.Xcb7V-dKgn0 [https://perma.cc/U78K-KVPC]. 
 34. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States 
and the European Union, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 877, 878–79 (2014); see also Max, supra note 6. 
 35. Max, supra note 6; Schwartz & Solove, supra note 34, at 879. 
 36. See Christopher Wolf, Envisioning Privacy in the World of Big Data, in PRIVACY IN THE 
MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS, supra note 17, at 204, 208; see also Paul M. Schwartz & 
Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1841–45 (2011) (describing means by which data can become identifiable); 
Soltani, supra note 9 (looking specifically at how information gathered via mobile analytics techniques 
can become identifiable); Deborah Hurley, Taking the Long Way Home: The Human Right of Privacy 
(explaining that the combination of the Internet of Things and nascent big data may make it challenging 
to maintain anonymity), in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS, supra note 17, 
at 70, 76. 
 37. NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 43; SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 
8 (2019); Altshuler, supra note 4. 
 38. ZUBOFF, supra note 37; Altshuler, supra note 4; see also Drew Harwell & Abha Bhattarai, Inside 
Amazon Go: The Camera-Filled Convenience Store That Watches You Back, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 
2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/01/22/inside-amazon-go-the-
camera-filled-convenience-store-that-watches-you-back/ [https://perma.cc/X5C8-P3B2] (examining the 
cashierless Amazon Go store and explaining that powerful companies like Amazon have more than just 
data on a shopper’s purchases—“‘they’re also connected with . . . nearly every aspect of [the shopper’s] 
life,’ including where people live and what they buy, read and watch,” which all feed into a shopper’s 
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Privacy advocates also argue that these superpowered profiles 
open the door for automated discrimination, whereby shopper 
profiles deemed most profitable receive tailored deals, different 
pricing, and better service than consumers on the less profitable end 
of the spectrum.39 Likewise, minorities and other groups could also 
receive disparate treatment based on data collected.40 Another big 
concern is that as these technologies become more powerful, they 
also become more inconspicuous or invisible to shoppers: they are 
embedded in the phones they carry or in shelves, ceilings, and other 
areas throughout the shopping experience.41 
B. Protections Under Current Privacy Laws 
Despite changing societal norms and the advent of the 
“oversharing economy,” or the “era of revelation,” there appears to 
be a broad agreement that privacy is not a dead issue and still 
deserves protection, according to privacy professor and expert Anita 
Allen.42 However, as it stands, the Constitution does not explicitly 
 
profile (quoting Danielle Citron, law professor at University of Maryland School of Law)). 
 39. TUROW, supra note 15, at 10–11. 
 40. See Emily Birnbaum, Key House Committee Offers Online Privacy Bill Draft, THE HILL (Dec. 
18, 2019, 5:16 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/475191-key-house-committee-offers-online-
privacy-bill-draft [https://perma.cc/ZX5P-3X7B] (noting that the first draft of a bipartisan federal 
privacy bill includes specific provisions “bar[ring] companies from using data in ways that result in 
discrimination against minorities and other populations”). 
 41. See Terry, supra note 6; Soltani, supra note 9; see also NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 23  
(“[T]he trend is toward systems of networked sensors that are so small as to be imperceptible by 
humans, some on the nanoscale.” (citation omitted)); see also Hurley, supra note 36 (“Much 
of . . . information activity will happen outside the limits of human sensory and temporal awareness.”); 
Schneier, supra note 17 (noting that “ubiquitous surveillance is not only possible but cheap and easy”). 
See generally How it Works, RETAILNEXT, https://retailnext.net/en/how-it-works/ 
[https://perma.cc/HTZ2-R7CC] (providing an example of the power of a retail analytics platform and 
the wide variety of sources that can already be aggregated). 
 42. See Anita L. Allen, Lecture, What Must We Hide: The Ethics of Privacy and the Ethos of 
Disclosure, 25 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 1, 5, 18 (2012) (describing the “era of revelation” as an era 
heavily influenced by technology and marked by individual preoccupation with “broadcasting what we 
know, think, do, and feel” and noting a developing indifference to privacy); Toby Daniels, How 
Overenthusiasm for Tech Led to an Era of Oversharing and Data, ADWEEK (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.adweek.com/performance-marketing/how-overenthusiasm-for-tech-led-to-an-era-of-
oversharing-and-data-scandals/ (observing a shift in consumer infatuation with social media and 
explaining how “[o]versharing became the new normal”); see also, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc., 402 F. 
Supp. 3d 767, 776 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (rejecting vehemently Facebook’s views that social media users 
cannot reasonably expect their personal information and communications to remain private, even after 
sharing with friends, writing: “Facebook’s argument could not be more wrong”); Birnbaum, supra note 
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grant a right to privacy, and neither a single plenary data protection 
regulator nor a single definition of PII, which triggers the application 
of privacy law, exists.43 Instead, privacy laws are largely a sectoral 
hodgepodge of differing governmental views on consumers’ rights, 
leaving several unregulated gaps.44 At the federal level, for instance, 
no law directly regulates data collection and use by companies such 
as Facebook and Google, let alone brick-and-mortar retailers.45 
Further, in comparison to the European Union and other 
industrialized nations, privacy standards in the U.S. have been 
described as “fragment[ed] and hollow,” providing few limits on data 
collection, use, and disclosure.46 
Accordingly, the FTC, which stepped in to mitigate this void in the 
early nineties, has become the broadest and most influential protector 
of information privacy in the U.S.—more so than any privacy statute 
 
40 (highlighting bipartisan support for a federal privacy bill). See generally Jeewon Kim Serrato et al., 
U.S. States Pass Data Protection Laws on the Heels of the GDPR, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT: DATA 
PROT. REP. (July 9, 2018), https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2018/07/u-s-states-pass-data-
protection-laws-on-the-heels-of-the-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/7NX6-4J6S] (summarizing recent state 
legislation expanding data protection). 
 43. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 238; Natasha Singer, The Government Protects Our Food and 
Cars. Why Not Our Data?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/02/sunday-
review/data-protection-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/L9MM-XW6R] (“The United States is virtually 
the only developed nation without a comprehensive consumer data protection law and an independent 
agency to enforce it.”); Doug Linder, The Right of Privacy, EXPLORING CONST. CONFLICTS, 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/rightofprivacy.html [https://perma.cc/TH7W-
ZEUA] (exploring in detail whether the Constitution protects the right to privacy); Schwartz & Solove, 
supra note 36, at 1816, 1826–27 (arguing that PII is one of the most important concepts in privacy 
regulation because numerous state and federal statutes rely on its distinction and share the basic 
assumption that in the absence of PII, no privacy harm exists). 
 44. NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 238; Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11; see also Natasha Singer, 
The Week in Tech: Why Californians Have Better Privacy Protections, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/technology/the-week-in-tech-why-californians-have-better-
privacy-protections.html [https://perma.cc/7RA4-HR57]. Privacy advocates criticize a “sectoral” 
approach because they contend that there is no express right to privacy in the Constitution or legislation, 
and privacy is thus viewed as a preference that may be lightly bartered off according to competitive free 
market norms. NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 237–38. Instead, privacy advocates tend to prefer an 
“omnibus” approach because it is seen as recognizing privacy as a fundamental human right that cannot 
be bartered off due to an overarching national commitment to privacy constraints detailed in legislation. 
Id. 
 45. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11. 
 46. Id. at 586–87; Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and 
International Rules in Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 23 n.82 (2000); 
Singer, supra note 43; see also Hurley, supra note 36, at 74 (noting that, unlike other countries, the U.S. 
has failed to keep up as information and communication technologies have advanced, leaving 
Americans with fewer protections for their personal data). 
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or common law tort.47 In fact, “[t]oday, the FTC is viewed as the de 
facto federal data protection authority.”48 However, because the FTC 
cannot practically set substantive privacy rules or generally impose 
penalties unless an entity has violated an existing FTC order, it has 
acted primarily as an enforcer, proceeding under a general grant of 
authority grounded in section 5(a) of the FTC Act, which prohibits 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”49 
Under this framework, a rich collection of over 500 enforcement 
FTC actions related to consumer privacy have been likened to 
privacy “common law” by Professors Daniel Solove and Woodrow 
Hartzog.50 Moreover, the understanding of “unfair or deceptive acts” 
has expanded to include not only a failure to comply with published 
privacy promises, but also a general theory of deception with respect 
to obtaining personal information and providing insufficient notice of 
 
 47. Marc Rotenberg, EPIC: The First Twenty Years (describing how the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (EPIC), a privacy interest group, turned to the FTC to strengthen privacy regulation 
amid a “patchwork of law . . . emerging in the United States in the early 1990s that seemed inefficient 
and incoherent”), in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS, supra note 17, at 10, 
10–11; Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11. 
 48. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 600. The FTC was originally created in 1914 with the intent 
to “ensure fair competition in commerce,” but “[a]t the urging of Congress” and privacy interest groups 
in 1995, “the FTC became involved with consumer privacy issues.” Id. at 598; Rotenberg, supra note 
47, at 11; Our History, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history 
[https://perma.cc/BV6Y-DRKC]. 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 45; see also A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law 
Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-
do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/FBL2-DV4D] (Oct. 2019); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY 
& DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2017 (2018) [hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM’N 2017], 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2017-overview-
commissions-enforcement-policy-initiatives-consumer/privacy_and_data_security_update_2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WWJ3-UBC8]; Jessica Rich, Opinion, Give the F.T.C. Some Teeth to Guard Our 
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/opinion/ftc-privacy-
congress.html [https://perma.cc/3LWM-RCZJ]. The FTC has investigative and enforcement tools and 
broad jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 45, but with some significant limits to its power. § 45; Chris Jay 
Hoofnagle et al., The FTC Can Rise to the Privacy Challenge, but Not Without Help from Congress, 
BROOKINGS: TECHTANK (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/08/08/the-ftc-
can-rise-to-the-privacy-challenge-but-not-without-help-from-congress/ [https://perma.cc/XD8M-
9JDW]. The FTC cannot set broad, normative privacy standards and cannot impose penalties on 
wrongdoers “unless they’re already under an order for [a] previous wrongdoing . . . .” Rich, supra. 
 50. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 619, 621, 622–23 (arguing that privacy-related settlements 
the FTC issues are the functional equivalent of privacy common law, much like bodies of case law, 
given their publicized nature, precedential treatment by privacy practitioners, and consistency);  FED. 
TRADE COMM’N 2017, supra note 49, at 2. 
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invasive activities.51 This privacy oversight is largely recognized as 
the notice-and-choice regime and offers much counsel for online 
practices.52 
Notably absent from this oversight, however, is counsel within the 
specific context of brick-and-mortar technology—to date, only one 
FTC settlement has addressed in-store tracking.53 Without 
prescriptive regulations, businesses face uncertainty in navigating 
whether conduct falls within a safe harbor and are therefore forced to 
interpret FTC actions and guidance for “compliance nuggets.”54 
Questions as to the actual scope of the FTC’s powers have further 
muddied the waters.55 
Meanwhile, at the state level, most privacy and tort laws have 
historically been ineffective at addressing these emerging digital 
problems.56 But because of little progress made on a federal law, 
many states have started taking matters into their own hands.57 
 
 51. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 627–43 (providing an in-depth analysis of FTC privacy 
jurisprudence over “unfair or deceptive acts”). 
 52. See id. at 592. 
 53. Retail Tracking Firm Settles FTC Charges It Misled Consumers About Opt Out Choices, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Retail Tracking Firm], https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2015/04/retail-tracking-firm-settles-ftc-charges-it-misled-consumers 
[https://perma.cc/E93M-BHE3] (“The complaint is the FTC’s first against a retail tracking company.”). 
 54. See William R. Denny, Cybersecurity As an Unfair Practice: FTC Enforcement Under Section 5 
of the FTC Act, A.B.A. (June 20, 2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2016/06/cyber_center_denny 
[https://perma.cc/MC5P-2UUM]. 
 55.  See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Shire Viropharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 160–61 (3d Cir. 2019) (narrowing the 
time frame that the FTC can investigate and bring cases under its section 13(b) powers by finding that 
the FTC could not state a claim after a five-year gap had lapsed between when the alleged misconduct 
ended and when the FTC filed its complaint). 
 56. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 587–88. Technology has outpaced conceptions of privacy 
torts and foreclosed application against retail stores because courts remain unwilling to extend 
expectations of privacy to public spaces and continue to find that privacy does not exist if the 
information has been either exposed to the public or disclosed to others. Vincent Nguyen, Shopping for 
Privacy: How Technology in Brick-and-Mortar Retail Stores Poses Privacy Risks for Shoppers, 29 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 535, 560–61 (2019). 
 57. Adam Stone, As Privacy Concerns Grow, States Create Bold Policies, GOV’T TECH. (July–Aug. 
2019), https://www.govtech.com/policy/As-Privacy-Concerns-Grow-States-Create-Bold-Policies.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y2RU-2BPM] (quoting Washington Senator Reuven Carlyle as saying that “the 
federal government has made themselves functionally irrelevant,” and noting that rather than wait 
anymore, Senator Carlyle and other state leaders are stepping up to assert control over the issue); Sarah 
Rippy, US State Comprehensive Privacy Law Comparison, IAPP, 
https://iapp.org/resources/article/state-comparison-table/ [https://perma.cc/B9QQ-E6SR] (Mar. 3, 2021); 
Michael Beckerman, Americans Will Pay a Price for State Privacy Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2019), 
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California, in particular, has already developed one of the most 
comprehensive privacy measures in the United States after the bill 
raced through the state legislature with grudging support to avoid an 
even tougher ballot initiative.58 The CCPA essentially grants 
consumers an exclusive right to privacy regarding all of their 
personal information.59 Like the GDPR, which recognizes privacy 
and the protection of personal data as fundamental human rights, the 
CCPA provides strong protections for consumers.60 The recently 
passed California Privacy Rights Act, which amends the CCPA and 
takes effect in January 2023 with a “look back” to January 2022 for 
enforcement purposes, expands protections even further.61 
Without a national privacy law, the GDPR and the hastily passed 
CCPA have become the new face of information privacy legislation, 
with many states pushing to introduce mirror legislation.62 However, 
the costs of compliance and risk of error in navigating fifty unique 
state laws along with any applicable federal and foreign laws could 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/opinion/state-privacy-laws.html [https://perma.cc/Z3B2-RKKN]; 
Grande, supra note 13; Bennett Cyphers, Big Tech’s Disingenuous Push for a Federal Privacy Law, 
EFF (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/09/big-techs-disingenuous-push-federal-
privacy-law [https://perma.cc/8XF4-8AWF]. 
 58. Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-online-privacy-law.html 
[https://perma.cc/NN77-US3U] (“The bill raced through the State Legislature without opposition on 
[June 28th] and was signed into law by Gov. Jerry Brown, just hours before a deadline to pull from the 
November ballot an initiative seeking even tougher oversight over technology companies.”); Katelyn 
Ringrose & Jeremy Greenberg, California Privacy Legislation: A Timeline of Key Events, FUTURE OF 
PRIVACY F., https://fpf.org/2020/07/01/california-privacy-legislation-a-timeline-of-key-events/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q4G7-Y6PQ] (Aug. 31, 2020) (showing by timeline the short window within which 
legislators rushed to pass the CCPA to head off a stricter ballot initiative). 
 59. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2020) (providing a right to request disclosure of personal 
information collected); id. § 1798.105 (providing a right to request deletion of information collected); 
id. §§ 1798.110, .115 (providing a right to request disclosure of personal information sold to third 
parties); id. § 1798.120 (providing a right to request that personal information not be sold to third 
parties); id. § 1798.140. 
 60. Wakabayashi, supra note 58. 
 61. See Michele Cohen, The California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 Passed, Now What?, JD SUPRA 
(Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-california-privacy-rights-act-of-57046/ 
[https://perma.cc/8JGE-2DMA]. 
 62. See Wakabayashi, supra note 58 and accompanying text; Rippy, supra note 57; Stone, supra 
note 57 (citing California Senator Bob Hertzberg describing the states stepping in on marijuana 
legislation because of the size and slow-moving nature of the federal government as an apt analogy for 
privacy rights); Grande, supra note 13. See generally Serrato et al., supra note 42. 
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create a nightmare for some businesses.63 Multiple conflicting laws 
would also create confusion and inconsistent outcomes for consumers 
as they shop locally, online, and across the country.64 Stricter online 
protections also raise additional questions about how these laws 
would apply to brick-and-mortar.65 In-store tracking technologies 
remain unaddressed in current legislation and barely figure into 
current debates, despite brick-and-mortar control of 84% of all retail 
sales, even during the COVID-19 pandemic.66 As such, a dire need 
for more uniform direction concerning information privacy exists, 
particularly in the brick-and-mortar context.67 
II. ANALYSIS 
Thanks to pressure from the GDPR and the CCPA, for the first 
time, there is a general consensus among Congress and both 
consumer and business interest groups alike that a national privacy 
law is well-founded.68 To this end, more than a dozen bills and 
 
 63. See generally Grande, supra note 13. 
 64. Beckerman, supra note 57. 
 65. See McKinnon, supra note 5; McDowell et al., supra note 15 (highlighting existing ambiguity as 
to brick-and-mortar obligations); Andrew Burt, Why Privacy Regulations Don’t Always Do What 
They’re Meant To, HARV. BUS. REV.: SEC. & PRIV. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/10/why-
privacy-regulations-dont-always-do-what-theyre-meant-to [https://perma.cc/GC4Z-RL9U] (explaining 
that, in the context of the GDPR, a challenge with overly broad and generic regulations is that they treat 
all organizations the same and fail to include explicit recommendations or specific prohibitions in a way 
that is immediately clear for all companies). 
 66. TUROW, supra note 15; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., CB20-120, QUARTERLY 
RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES 2ND QUARTER 2020, at 2 tbl.1 (2020). 
 67. See generally Beckerman, supra note 57 (explaining that a patchwork of state laws are becoming 
more convoluted, benefiting only lawyers and the data compliance industry); Grande, supra note 13 
(highlighting growing businesses’ vulnerability to a complex and inconsistent regulatory environment 
with increased state regulation); McDowell et al., supra note 15 (noting uncertainty as to whether 
notice-and-choice applies in the brick-and-mortar context); Comment Letter from David French, Senior 
Vice President, Nat’l Retail Fed’n, to David J. Redl, Assistant Sec’y for Commc’ns & Info., Nat’l 
Telecomms. & Info. Admin. 3 (Nov. 9, 2019) [hereinafter NRF Comment Letter], 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/nrf_comments_to_ntia_re_consumer_privacy_submitte
d_9_nov_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/85S9-VLWY] (emphasizing concern for the risk of misjudging 
different state laws that brick-and-mortar stores absorb in trying to serve their customers). 
 68. Grande, supra note 13 (observing support from the business community, including the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, The Software Alliance, and tech giants such as Google, Microsoft, and Apple); 
Rich, supra note 49 (highlighting the push for a broad, nationwide privacy standard among consumer 
advocates, industry leaders, and the FTC since the late 1990s); Cyphers, supra note 57 (observing that 
after years of fighting any kind of privacy legislation, big tech companies are now looking to the federal 
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discussion drafts targeting more comprehensive online privacy 
reform were circulated in the 116th Congress.69 To advance this 
dialogue, other members of Congress, along with privacy advocacy 
organizations and businesses, also offered model legislation drafts 
and policy frameworks, and congressional committees held a handful 
of privacy-related government hearings.70 
Although none of these items individually may anticipate the 
contents of a final federal act, collectively they mark the contours of 
the chief issues moving into the next congressional session. 
Accordingly, a review of these materials first reveals broad support 
for increased consumer privacy protections beyond the current 
 
government to save them from the states); Comment Letter from Nicholas R. Ahrens, Vice President of 
Priv. & Cybersecurity, Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, to Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin. (Nov. 9, 2018) 
[hereinafter RILA Comment Letter], 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/rila_ntia_privacy_comment_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/32NT-LRE7] (agreeing with the need for a uniform standard). 
 69. SAFE DATA Act, S. 4626, 116th Cong. (2020); Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3300, 116th 
Cong. (2020); Consumer Data Privacy and Security Act of 2020, S. 3456, 116th Cong. (2020); 
Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. (2019); Information Transparency & 
Personal Data Control Act, H.R. 2013, 116th Cong. (2019); Online Privacy Act of 2019, H.R. 4978, 
116th Cong. (2019); Privacy Bill of Rights Act, S. 1214, 116th Cong. (2019); Mind Your Own Business 
Act of 2019, S. 2637, 116th Cong. (2019); ADD Act, S. 142, 116th Cong. (2019); Social Media Privacy 
Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2019, S. 189, 116th Cong. (2019); DATA Privacy Act, S. 583, 
116th Cong. (2019); BROWSER Act of 2019, S. 1116, 116th Cong. (2019); Birnbaum, supra note 40 
(discussing that the House Energy and Commerce Committee circulated the discussion draft of 
bipartisan federal privacy legislation); S. COMM. ON COM., SCI. & TRANSP., UNITED STATES CONSUMER 
DATA PRIVACY ACT OF 2019 DISCUSSION DRAFT (2019) [hereinafter USCDPA], 
https://aboutblaw.com/NaZ [https://perma.cc/V42B-LJ2H]; S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., & URB. 
AFF., DATA ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 2020 (2020), 
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Brown%20-
%20DATA%202020%20Discussion%20Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/KC64-4ZUG]. 
 70. See generally, e.g., Examining Legislative Proposals to Protect Consumer Data Privacy: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong. (2019); Protecting Consumer 
Privacy in the Era of Big Data: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Com. of the H. Comm. 
on Energy & Com., 116th Cong. (2019); Legislation, INTEL [hereinafter Intel Legislation], 
https://usprivacybill.intel.com/legislation [https://perma.cc/9HCL-NS5X]; Privacy for America Releases 
Detailed Policy Framework to Provide Strong Data Privacy Protections for All Americans, PRIV. FOR 
AMERICA (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.privacyforamerica.com/detailed-policy-framework-to-provide-
strong-data-privacy-protections/ [https://perma.cc/P434-TZFG]; SENATE DEMOCRATS, PRIVACY AND 
DATA PROTECTION FRAMEWORK, https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Final_CMTE%20
Privacy%20Principles_11.14.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/JA7D-NP24] (outlining the Senate Democratic 
leaders privacy principles); CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., CDT FEDERAL BASELINE PRIVACY 
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notice-and-choice model.71 A closer look, however, specifically at 
the bills and proposals introduced in the 116th Congress, betrays 
bipartisan consensus on several key issues. 
For example, most congressional members agree on the need for a 
federal privacy regulator.72 Although some would appoint the FTC, 
others are unconvinced of the FTC’s fitness, perhaps siding with 
critics on the FTC’s “inadequacy and toothlessness” and past of 
“rampant regulatory overreach” when it held broad authority to issue 
substantive rules.73 The bills and proposals would also generally 
minimize data collection and put information safeguards in place.74 
Additionally, despite PII’s conceptual problems, lawmakers in the 
116th Congress widely agreed that some concept of PII is necessary 
moving forward.75 
More significantly, a number of the bills and proposals approach 
privacy reform by concentrating on strengthening consumer control 
of data, similar to the CCPA, albeit with variances on the types of 
 
 71. See, e.g., S. 3300, § 2 (noting that increasing digitalization of information has magnified the 
harm to individual privacy and as such it is necessary for Congress to act); Fact Sheet: Chairman 
Wicker’s Discussion Draft the United States Consumer Data Privacy Act, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON COM. 
SCI. & TRANSP. (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2019/12/chairman-wicker-s-
discussion-draft-the-united-states-consumer-data-privacy-act [https://perma.cc/J2XM-56WX] 
(explaining that the twenty-first-century American economy is increasingly driven by data, leading to 
numerous high-profile misuses of data, for which consumers have demanded Congress step in); SENATE 
DEMOCRATS, supra note 70 (emphasizing that basic legal frameworks protecting privacy have not 
evolved to meet the new reality of technology and data collection); see also Cameron F. Kerry, Breaking 
Down Proposals for Privacy Legislation: How Do They Regulate?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/breaking-down-proposals-for-privacy-legislation-how-do-they-
regulate/ [https://perma.cc/L6YJ-DQL2] (showing that notice-and-choice is widely viewed as 
insufficient among privacy mavens). 
 72. See S. 2637, § 8 (creating a “Bureau of Technology” within the FTC); S. 142, § 5 (naming the 
FTC as the federal privacy regulator); S. 3456, § 9 (naming the FTC as the federal privacy regulator); 
Birnbaum, supra note 40 (creating a bureau within the FTC). But see S. 3300, § 4(a) (establishing a 
“Data Protection Agency” instead); H.R. 4978, § 301 (establishing an independent “United States 
Digital Privacy Agency” instead). 
 73. See Ryan Moshell, And Then There Was One: The Outlook for a Self-Regulatory United States 
Amidst a Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357, 383 
(2005); Alex Propes, Privacy & FTC Rulemaking Authority: A Historical Context, IAB (Nov. 6, 2018), 
https://www.iab.com/news/privacy-ftc-rulemaking-authority-a-historical-context/ 
[https://perma.cc/MF3R-BLCS]. 
 74. See, e.g., S. 3456 §§ 3(d), 6 (including specific data minimization and data security provisions); 
S. 2968 §§ 106, 107 (same); H.R. 4978, §§ 201, 214 (same); S. 1214 §§ 12, 13; USCDPA, supra note 
69, at 10–11, 17–18 (same). 
 75. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 36, at 1828; see also, e.g., S. 3300 § 3(5); S. 3456 § 2(9); S. 
2968 § 2(8); S. 2637 § 2(12); H.R. 4978 § 2(13). 
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controls given to consumers.76 This approach contrasts with the 
business accountability approach that businesses and organizations 
advanced in their policy frameworks and in the provisions of drafts 
like the United States Consumer Data Privacy Act (USCDPA).77 
Notably, the deceptively subtle differences between these two 
approaches could present very different outcomes for 
brick-and-mortar tracking technologies.78 
Perhaps the biggest privacy reform battles in the 116th Congress, 
however, took shape in a category privacy expert Cameron Kerry 
labeled as “end game issues,” which he argues “are too politically 
charged to resolve without a clear picture of the substance of privacy 
protection in a bill.”79 These issues include private rights of action 
and preemption of state laws.80 Preemption is of particular concern in 
brick-and-mortar privacy rhetoric.81 
A. The Current Notice-and-Choice Regime 
When the FTC first stepped onto the privacy scene in 1995, it 
embraced the existing scheme of industry self-regulation out of “fear 
that regulation would stifle the growth of online activity.”82 Under 
this scheme, businesses essentially determined for themselves the 
basic rules they would adhere to regarding data collection, use, and 
 
 76. See sources cited supra note 59; see also S. 2968 §§ 102–05, 204(b) (providing a private right of 
action and base consumer rights of access, correction, deletion, portability, and information); H.R. 4978 
§§ 102–09, 407 (providing the same with additional consumer rights of human review of automated 
decisions, information, impermanence, and individual autonomy); S. 3456 §§ 4–5 (providing individual 
consumer rights of access, portability, and information but no private right of action); S. 1214 §§ 4–6, 
17 (providing a private right of action and base consumer rights); USCDPA, supra note 69, at 7–10 
(providing base consumer rights but no private right of action). 
 77. See CDT FEDERAL BASELINE, supra note 70; Intel Legislation, supra note 70; USCDPA, supra 
note 69; see also Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, 83 Fed. Reg. 48,600, 
48,600–01 (Sept. 26, 2018) (proposing a shift away from mandating notice-and-choice to focusing on 
outcomes of organizational practices in 2018). 
 78. See generally discussion infra Section II.B. 
 79. Cameron F. Kerry, Game On: What to Make of Senate Privacy Bills and Hearing, BROOKINGS: 
TECHTANK (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/12/03/game-on-what-to-
make-of-senate-privacy-bills-and-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/8799-TAQE]. 
 80. Id. 
 81. NRF Comment Letter, supra note 67; RILA Comment Letter, supra note 68, at 3. 
 82. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 598. 
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disclosure; businesses then stated the rules in privacy policies.83 This 
self-regulatory privacy regime has largely continued under the FTC 
but now “with some oversight,” relying on notice and choice as key 
aspects of enforcement.84 
The use of privacy policies arose out of the Fair Information 
Practices (FIPs), first stated in a 1973 U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) report and later expanded by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
in its 1980 privacy guidelines.85 The HEW report emerged as a 
response to the widespread use of automated data systems containing 
personal information, like social security numbers, in both the public 
and private sectors.86 Individuals’ right to notice about the collection 
and use of their data, and right to consent to this collection and use, 
were two of the most prominent FIPs and thus “became the backbone 
of the U.S. self-regulatory approach.”87 
1. FTC “Common Law” 
Initially, FTC oversight consisted mainly of adding some teeth to 
privacy policies, most of which lacked any penalty or consequence if 
a company failed to live up to its promises.88 This oversight has since 
grown into some general parameters around the notice-and-choice 
requirement.89 Vague language, technically correct but incomplete 
language, and language hidden in dense boilerplate policies have all 
been deemed insufficient for notice purposes.90 
Further, even if no notice is given, and thus no promise is broken, 
the FTC has taken a stance against surreptitious consumer 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 592, 604. 
 85. Id. at 592. See generally Pam Dixon, A Brief Introduction to Fair Information Practices, WORLD 
PRIV. F., https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2008/01/report-a-brief-introduction-to-fair-informatio 
n-practices/ [https://perma.cc/43LZ-P9JB] (Dec. 19, 2007) (discussing the FIPs of the HEW report and a 
list of the eight expanded principles codified in the OECD Guidelines of 1980). 
 86. Hoofnagle, supra note 4. 
 87. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 592–93. 
 88. Id. at 604. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. at 634–36. 
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surveillance online.91 In In re Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc., the FTC 
found that installing spyware and gathering data without notice was 
an unfair practice.92 Although the FTC did not allege in its complaint 
that Aspen Way made any privacy-related promises, the FTC deemed 
the surreptitious data gathering unfair due to the substantial harm 
caused to consumers from such invasive surveillance and concerns 
that “[c]onsumers [could not] reasonably avoid these injuries because 
[the surveillance was] invisible to them.”93 
In the specific context of brick-and-mortar tracking, the FTC has 
handled only one case.94 In In re Nomi Technologies, Inc., the FTC 
found that shopper tracking in brick-and-mortar can also be deceptive 
if consumers are not adequately informed of these activities.95 
Specifically, the FTC found that Nomi’s representations in its privacy 
policies that consumers were “always” allowed to opt-out of its 
mobile tracking services were deceptive because an opt-out 
mechanism was available online but not in-store and because 
consumers were given no notice that they were being tracked at a 
retail location.96 
However, several issues take shape in In re Nomi.97 Although 
Nomi failed to offer an in-store opt-out as promised in its privacy 
policy, Nomi was not even required to offer such an option because it 
did not collect PII.98 Yet, for this single misstatement, which went 
beyond minimum standards, the FTC gave Nomi (a small, 
two-year-old start-up) the same punishment as Facebook (a 
 
 91. Id. at 641. 
 92. See Complaint at 4, In re Aspen Way Enters., Inc., FTC File No. 112-3151 (F.T.C. Apr. 11, 
2013) (No. C-4392) [hereinafter Aspen Complaint]; see also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 641. 
 93. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 641 (quoting Aspen Complaint, supra note 92, at 2). 
 94. Retail Tracking Firm, supra note 53. 
 95. Complaint at 2–3, In re Nomi Techs., Inc., FTC File No. 132-3251 (F.T.C. Aug. 28, 2015) (No. 
C-4538). 
 96. Id. 
 97. See generally Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, In re Nomi, FTC File 
No. 132-3251 (F.T.C. Sept. 12, 2015) (No. C-4538) [hereinafter Dissenting Statement of Commissioner 
Wright]; Tim Sparapani, Privacy and Security Innovation: The Cautionary Tale of Nomi Technologies 
and the FTC, FORBES (May 26, 2015, 11:46 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timsparapani/2015/05/26/privacy-and-security-innovation-the-cautionary-
tale-of-nomi-technologies-and-the-ftc/#64b31d9b4a38 [https://perma.cc/77K4-6C56]. 
 98. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Wright, supra note 97, at 1 (explaining that Nomi neither 
tracked individual consumers nor identified them); Sparapani, supra note 97. 
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multibillion-dollar company) despite little, if any, economic 
consumer injury.99 
2. Implications for Brick-and-Mortar 
The puzzling result in In re Nomi reflects an immediate need for 
greater penalty gradations and for more definition as to what 
constitutes an “injury” outside of economic harms.100 More 
importantly, it also highlights deeper issues concerning the 
practicality of the notice-and-choice regime and the FTC’s intention 
to apply it to in-store technologies, given that the FTC did not order 
any affirmative notice-and-choice obligations.101 
The In re Nomi decision is also particularly troubling given 
brick-and-mortar retail’s painful three-dimensional constraints that 
significantly stunt speed-to-market.102 For example, a simple graphic 
update on a merchandising display involves meticulous planning and 
project management to ensure the signage is printed, shipped, and 
installed in compliance with merchandising standards.103 Depending 
on the company’s approval process, the number of stores and 
differing store layouts, and the complexity of the project, this process 
could take weeks.104 As such, it is unsurprising that bigger 
 
 99. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Wright, supra note 97, at 4 (describing Nomi’s failure as 
a “minor shortcoming” and stating that “there [was] no evidence the misrepresentation harmed 
consumers”); Sparapani, supra note 97. 
 100. See Sparapani, supra note 97. 
 101. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Wright, supra note 97, at 1 (pointing out that even if the 
facts of the In re Nomi case did support a technical violation, prosecutorial discretion favored restraint); 
McDowell et al., supra note 15 (noting that the FTC’s approach in In re Nomi “raises the question of 
whether the FTC would ever impose a notice and choice obligation for offline, retail tracking” and 
provides “no certainty around the FTC’s view”); Sparapani, supra note 97 (hypothesizing that the 
effects of the In re Nomi order are “likely” to extend to all businesses). 
 102. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 29. 
 103. See A Guide to Retail Print Graphics, THE VOMELA COS., https://info.vomela.com/guide-to-
retail-print-graphics-windows-walls-floors?_ga=2.147550967.1931912370.1608421784-
1571079601.1608421784 [https://perma.cc/G83V-W8WS]. 
 104. See, e.g., THE VOMELA COS., PETCO DOG TREAT PROJECT 2, 
https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/1689179/Case%20Studies/Petco/VOM-MKT_Petco_Case-Study_V2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5B8W-DE9W] (detailing a case study on how updating simple merchandising graphics 
across 1,400 Petco stores took four weeks, not including the approval process). 
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store-of-the-future concepts are tested in innovation labs, with 
rollouts taking place years later.105 
Looking specifically at in-store tracking technologies, a national 
rollout, along with shipping and installation, requires mapping 
analytics objectives against measurable key performance indicators 
of the technology.106 It also includes numerous site visits to 
understand differing store layouts, determine hardware placement, 
evaluate adaptions for legacy systems, and test the technology.107 In 
this challenging three-dimensional store environment, a lack of 
certainty and fear of facing government fines or penalties inhibits 
already slow adoption and growth rates in innovative technologies, 
during a very competitive time.108 Although FTC oversight and the 
notice-and-choice regime have offered some aid for companies 
wrestling with data innovation and privacy, much uncertainty still 
remains for brick-and-mortar.109 
B. Moving Beyond Notice-and-Choice 
As the notice-and-choice regime continues to receive scrutiny, two 
key regulatory approaches appear in information privacy reform 
discussions: one focusing on consumer control and one focusing on 
business accountability.110 
 
 105. Ruff, supra note 22 (describing how big-box home improvement retailer Lowe’s created its 
innovation lab in 2015 to test concepts that rolled out several years later). The cashierless Amazon Go 
store offers another example of the timing and difficulty associated with a larger store-of-the-future 
rollout—the new store was announced in December 2016 with plans to open to the public in “early 
2017,” but due to “kinks” with the technology, the opening was ultimately pushed back almost a year. 
Laura Stevens, Amazon Delays Opening of Cashierless Store to Work Out Kinks, WALL ST. J.: TECH 
(Mar. 27, 2017, 10:41 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-delays-convenience-store-opening-
to-work-out-kinks-1490616133 [https://perma.cc/H94L-EC6Q]; Matt Day, Amazon Go Cashierless 
Convenience Store Opens to the Public in Seattle, SEATTLE TIMES, 
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/amazon/amazon-go-cashierless-convenience-store-opening-to-
the-public/ [https://perma.cc/7GZE-WA4M] (Jan. 22, 2018, 9:54 PM). 
 106. See WALKBASE, supra note 7, at 17–20. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See NRF Comment Letter, supra note 67, at 4. 
 109. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Wright, supra note 97, at 4 (explaining that the 
aggressive prosecution of Nomi “[sent] a dangerous message to [businesses] weighing the costs and 
benefits of voluntarily providing information and choice to consumers”); McDowell et al., supra note 
15; Sparapani, supra note 97; McKinnon, supra note 5. 
 110. See Kerry, supra note 71 (making a similar finding and referencing the two privacy models as 
consumer choice and business behavior); see also GDPR & CCPA: Opt-Ins, Consumer Control, and the 
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1. Consumer Control Approach 
The idea behind the first approach to privacy reform, followed by a 
number of privacy bills and proposals before the 116th Congress, is 
that the appropriate response to increased data pooling is increased 
consumer control of data.111 Advocates flock to this property-style 
model because it is seen as offering consumers the greatest 
protections and recognizing privacy more or less as a fundamental 
right.112 This is the premise behind the GDPR, the CCPA, the CPRA, 
and bills like the Data Protection Act of 2020 and the Consumer 
Online Privacy Rights Act.113 
Under this approach, privacy cannot be left to self-regulation when 
businesses have such substantial profit incentives.114 These models 
attempt to place consumers squarely in the driver’s seat with 
exclusive control of their personal data, frequently including some 
form of a private right of action (PRA) for consumers.115  
 
Impact on Competition and Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 3–4 
(2019) (statement of Jane Bambauer, Professor of Law, University of Arizona) [hereinafter Bambauer 
Statement] (referencing a property model and a harm- or risk-based approach). 
 111. Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 3. See generally Press Release, Sen. Maria Cantwell, 
Cantwell, Senate Democrats Unveil Strong Online Privacy Rights (Nov. 26, 2019), 
https://www.cantwell.senate.gov/news/press-releases/cantwell-senate-democrats-unveil-strong-online-
privacy-rights [https://perma.cc/T98G-MGVL]. 
 112. See generally Press Release, supra note 111; Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 3. 
 113. Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 3; S. 3300, 116th Cong. (2020); see also California 
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUST.: OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 
https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa [https://perma.cc/LUD8-NBA3]; Letter from Alastair Mactaggart to 
Initiative Coordinator, California Off. of the Att’y Gen. (Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Mactaggart Letter], 
https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/19-0021A1%20%28Consumer%20Privacy%20-
%20Version%203%29_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ6U-MVSJ]. 
 114. See Mactaggart Letter, supra note 113; see also Lily Hay Newman, Never Trust a Platform to 
Put Privacy Ahead of Profit, WIRED: SECURITY (Oct. 9, 2019, 2:32 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/twitter-two-factor-advertising/ [https://perma.cc/FFF3-RDZ7] (using 
examples of several big companies pulling phone numbers and other data used for two-factor 
authentication into their marketing databases to show that big companies are not prioritizing user 
privacy and security ahead of their business goals, despite having the resources to easily control and 
protect this data). 
 115. See Press Release, supra note 111; Kerry, supra note 71; Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, 
at 3; see also, e.g., S. 1214, 116th Cong. § 17(a)(1) (2019) (“Any individual alleging a violation . . . may 
bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction.”); Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 
2968, 116th Cong. § 301(c)(1) (2019) (“Any individual alleging a violation . . . may bring a civil action 
in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal.”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (West 
2020) (authorizing consumers to bring civil suits for statutory damages). 
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Many of these models continue to rely heavily on notice and 
consent before or during collection of PII, with limited 
exemptions.116 The CPRA has gone so far as to require that any 
consent given must be “freely given, specific, informed and 
unambiguous,” and one bill requires affirmative consent even for 
aggregated personal information used for behavioral personalization, 
offering an exemption only for the strict purpose of increasing 
usability for the benefit of the consumer.117 
Additionally, although one bill proposed setting a minimum 
percentage of individuals who must read and understand a notice or 
consent process, the bill, like its counterparts, fails to address 
problematic privacy policy and notice-delivery mechanisms in any 
meaningful way.118 Instead, the bills and proposals focus on arming 
consumers with a core set of individual rights, such as the rights of 
access, correction, deletion, portability, and information.119 
In defining PII, these models lean toward a more expansive 
definition. A number of the bills and proposals defined PII as 
information “linked or reasonably linkable” to an individual or 
device.120 According to Professors Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove, 
this broad standard allows for flexibility in adapting to new 
technological developments, unlike provisions that merely enumerate 
 
 116. Cameron F. Kerry & Caitlin Chin, Hitting Refresh on Privacy Policies: Recommendations for 
Notice and Transparency, BROOKINGS: TECHTANK (Jan. 6, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/01/06/hitting-refresh-on-privacy-policies-
recommendations-for-notice-and-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/5QUQ-37CC]; see also, e.g., Online 
Privacy Act of 2019, H.R. 4978, 116th Cong. § 212 (2019); Consumer Data Privacy and Security Act of 
2020, S. 3456, 116th Cong. § 3(b); S. 2968 §§ 102(b), 105(b)–(c) (2019). 
 117. Mactaggart Letter, supra note 113, at 22; H.R. 4978 §§ 106(b), (d). 
 118. See, e.g., H.R. 4978 § 213(d) (providing only that notice “shall be (A) clear and in plain 
language; and (B) made publicly available in a prominent location on an ongoing basis . . . [and] shall be 
made available . . . before any collection of personal information”). 
 119. See, e.g., H.R. 4978 §§ 101–107; S. 3456 §§ 4, 5. 
 120. See, e.g., H.R. 4978 § 2(13)(A)–(B) (defining PII as “any information maintained by a covered 
entity that is linked or reasonably linkable to a specific individual or a specific device, including 
de-identified personal information” (emphasis added)); S. 3456 § 2(9)(A), (C) (defining PII as 
“information that identifies or is linked or reasonably linkable to a specific individual” (emphasis 
added)); S. 3300 § 3(5) (defining PII as “any information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable 
of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular 
individual or device,” including “inferences drawn from any of [this] information . . . to create a profile 
about an individual reflecting the individual’s preferences, characteristics, psychological trends, 
predispositions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes” (emphasis added)). 
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a list of specific types of information, which can be too restrictive to 
adequately protect data.121 
However, because this broader definition employed by lawmakers 
does not account for PII’s flexible nature and because the boundaries 
of PII versus non-PII are still unknown, businesses contend that they 
are burdened with the risk of interpreting PII’s tricky boundaries.122 
According to Schwartz and Solove, businesses are also asked to 
endeavor in counterintuitive practices, given that they must build 
processes to link reasonably linkable information to satisfy individual 
rights like access, correction, and portability.123 And this feat 
becomes even more difficult and complex when a bill bans this 
identification process.124 
Critics also note that this approach is too onerous, posing 
substantial initial and ongoing compliance costs that could have a 
disparate impact on businesses.125 Under California’s CCPA, for 
example, nonprofits and businesses with annual revenues under $25 
million are exempt from data protection requirements, even though 
the sensitivity of the data collected and the consequences of 
compromise are the same.126 Meanwhile, one report has already 
found that companies subject to the requirements may have to pay up 
to $55 billion in initial compliance costs as a result of the CCPA 
alone.127 
Likewise, a laundry list of unlimited consumer rights may also 
pose some unintended consequences. Data portability, for example, 
 
 121. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 36, at 1829, 1832, 1871–72. 
 122. Id. at 1829 (noting that these types of definitions are unhelpful for distinguishing PII from 
non-PII); see also RILA Comment Letter, supra note 68, at 2. 
 123. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 36, at 1876–77. 
 124. See, e.g., H.R. 4978 § 206. 
 125. NRF Comment Letter, supra note 67, at 3; see also James Campbell et al., Privacy Regulation 
and Market Structure, 24 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 47, 47, 49 (2015) (demonstrating that 
compliance costs from privacy regulation will disproportionately burden smaller firms and new firms 
and proposing that “the impact on market structure should be an important part of the discussion on 
privacy regulation”). 
 126. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140 (West 2020). 
 127. Lauren Feiner, California’s New Privacy Law Could Cost Companies a Total of $55 Billion to 
Get in Compliance, CNBC: TECH, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/05/california-consumer-privacy-act-
ccpa-could-cost-companies-55-billion.html [https://perma.cc/4JTD-39UV] (Oct. 8, 2019, 10:38 AM). 
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could breed anticompetitive outcomes.128 And more importantly, 
requirements like right of access and data portability, which require a 
business to collect all information related to an individual and 
produce a record of it, risk a new and formidable privacy threat—an 
individual’s entire data profile could be fraudulently requested and 
used to harm the individual.129 
Finally, a significant critique of the consumer control approach is 
that it places “too much of [a] burden on individual[] [consumers] to 
manage their [own] privacy.”130 To exercise control, consumers are 
tasked with upgrading their digital literacy and monitoring their data 
for each business interaction, as data collection “becom[es] more 
sophisticated and less transparent every day.”131 However, research 
actually reveals that consumers do not read or understand privacy 
policies, are heavily influenced by the way choice is framed, and 
harbor many preexisting and incorrect assumptions about what 
policies protect.132 As such, congressional members like New Jersey 
Representative Frank Pallone (D), Mississippi Senator Roger Wicker 
(R), and Washington Senator Maria Cantwell (D) have all labeled 
privacy policies as “unrealistic and unfair,” “lengthy and confusing,” 
and “no longer enough,” respectively.133 
 
 128. RILA Comment Letter, supra note 68, at 2. 
 129. See generally JAMES PAVUR & CASEY KNERR, BLACKHAT, GDPARRRRR: USING PRIVACY LAWS 
TO STEAL IDENTITIES (2019), https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Thursday/us-19-Pavur-GDPArrrrr-Using-
Privacy-Laws-To-Steal-Identities-wp.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YAR-56G3]. 
 130. Kerry, supra note 71 (noting that though consumer control, namely “[g]reater transparency and 
individual decision-making,” certainly “[has] a place in comprehensive privacy legislation,” consumer 
control approaches “are far from sufficient in a digital environment in which control is so elusive” and 
put “too much of the burden on individuals to manage their privacy protection”). 
 131. James P. Nehf, The FTC’s Proposed Framework for Privacy Protection Online: A Move Toward 
Substantive Controls or Just More Notice and Choice?, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1727, 1734–43 
(2011) (providing several reasons why consumers are not capable of protecting their own privacy); see 
also Altshuler, supra note 4; Zarsky, supra note 19 (arguing that a majority of consumers are 
disinterested in managing the particulars of their personal information). 
 132. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1883–88 (2013) (describing cognitive and structural problems that consumers 
have with privacy self-management). According to a recent study, only around “one-in-five adults 
overall say they always . . . or often . . . read a company’s privacy policy before agreeing to it,” with 
only 22% of adults who ever read a privacy policy saying they read it all the way. Auxier et al., supra 
note 19. 
 133. Kerry & Chin, supra note 116 (first quoting New Jersey Representative Frank Pallone; then 
quoting Mississippi Senator Roger Wicker; and then quoting Washington Senator Maria Cantwell). 
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2. Business Accountability Approach 
The second approach to privacy reform shifts the responsibility of 
protecting privacy from consumers to the businesses that hold their 
data.134 Rather than focusing on consumer ownership of data, this 
second approach focuses on business conduct and what happens to 
the data once it is collected.135 
Because “overly prescriptive [models] can result in compliance 
checklists that stymie innovative privacy solutions,” some of these 
types of proposals offer more flexible behavioral standards.136 These 
standards allow for flexibility in developing solutions based on a 
business’s particular circumstances, in contrast to strict, 
one-size-fits-all rules.137 For example, Intel proposed legislation that 
includes a general duty of care “to take reasonable . . . measures not 
to intentionally process personal data in a manner that would have 
the reasonably foreseeable consequence of directly causing a natural 
person to suffer significant physical injury or unmerited . . . financial 
loss.”138 
Moreover, although consumers may still be given various rights to 
their data under this approach, these rights are generally limited when 
they become unduly burdensome or create impracticability for 
businesses.139 For example, the Center for Democracy and 
Technology put forth draft privacy legislation that allows for the right 
 
 134. See Kerry, supra note 71; SENATE DEMOCRATS, supra note 70, at 2 (calling for “real 
accountability” by shifting “the responsibility and liability of protecting privacy from consumers, who 
are overly burdened with understanding complicated, take-it-or-leave-it privacy policies, to the entities 
that hold their data and their senior corporate executives”). 
 135. See Kerry, supra note 71. 
 136. See Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, 83 Fed. Reg. 48,600, 
48,600–01 (Sept. 26, 2018) (differentiating between strict, principle-based approaches, like models that 
mandate notice and choice, and those that focus on organizational practices without dictating what the 
practices should be). 
 137. See id. 
 138. Intel Legislation, supra note 70; see also Kerry, supra note 71 (analyzing the implications of this 
duty of care). 
 139. See CDT FEDERAL BASELINE, supra note 70, at 2–4 (providing a right of data portability only 
“[w]here technically feasible”; a right of deletion, along with a list of exceptions, such as if fulfillment 
would create a legitimate risk to privacy; and a right of correction within limited situations); Intel 
Legislation, supra note 70 (proposing consumers have “reasonable access to . . . personal data” and 
“reasonable obscurity of personal data” where it “is likely to create significant privacy risk to the 
individual that is disproportionate to the public benefit”). 
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of correction but limits this right to situations where the data is health 
information, or it could be used for an eligibility determination or 
educational opportunity.140 
Another hallmark of this approach is the use of accountability 
mechanisms that place the burden of ensuring compliance on the 
businesses and senior executives who hold consumer data, rather than 
on the consumer.141 For example, one bill provides for businesses to 
designate a privacy officer, a data security officer, and internal 
controls to ensure that senior management is involved in risk 
assessment.142 The FTC’s routine practice of investigating and 
charging individual executives of small firms for privacy violations 
to motivate other executives to ensure compliance is also illustrative 
of this point.143 Accordingly, rather than advocating for private rights 
of action, this second approach proposes stronger enforcement, 
navigated through more capable backstops like state attorneys 
general, in addition to a federal privacy enforcer.144 
In defining PII, these models largely replicate definitions existing 
in consumer control models, but they appear to make greater 
allowances for uses of aggregated data.145 However, unlike many 
consumer control bills and proposals, this second approach places 
emphasis on transparency and makes some departure from notions of 
consent, with one proposal by the Center for Democracy and 
Technology specifically outlining unfair data process practices.146 
 
 140. CDT FEDERAL BASELINE, supra note 70, at 2–3. 
 141. See USCDPA, supra note 69, at 19. See generally CDT FEDERAL BASELINE, supra note 70 
(providing obligations of covered entities regarding personal information and outlining prohibited 
categories of data use except as necessary to deliver specific features or services). 
 142. See USCDPA, supra note 69, at 19. 
 143. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Chopra, supra note 3, at 11, 19 (finding that there is 
precedent for the FTC to charge individual officers and hold them personally liable and dissenting on 
the release of CEO Mark Zuckerberg and other executives, counseling that, like executives at small 
companies who are “routinely” charged, they should be held accountable); Dissenting Statement of 
Commissioner Slaughter, supra note 3, at 6, 14. 
 144. USCDPA, supra note 69, at 20–22. 
 145. Compare USCDPA, supra note 69, at 2–3 (excluding aggregated, de-identified data from the 
definition of covered data), with S. 3300, 116th Cong. § 3(5) (2020) (including “inferences drawn” from 
any linked or reasonably linkable information “to create a profile about an individual reflecting the 
individual’s preferences, characteristics, psychological trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes, 
intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes” within the definition of covered data). 
 146. CDT FEDERAL BASELINE, supra note 70, at 10–12. 
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Notably, business accountability models were less popular than 
consumer control models in the 116th Congress. But experts attribute 
this adoption rate to difficulties in formalizing standards and the 
obvious political appeal of models that appear to give consumers full 
control.147 Elements of business behavior are also beginning to 
appear in consumer control models.148 Nonetheless, as digitalization 
of information magnifies the harm to individual privacy, critics 
demand that corporate titans, concerned only with their bottom lines, 
must be checked.149 
III. PROPOSAL 
Discussions surrounding information privacy reform boil down to 
two key competing interests: the need to secure consumers’ personal 
information and the need to preserve technological innovation and 
business competitiveness.150 Long-running, irreconcilable differences 
have shown that no solution will elegantly resolve these competing 
interests.151 Additionally, the ever-expanding universe of issues 
dealing with information privacy and the remarkable diversity among 
the industries and businesses being regulated give hope for a 
one-size-fits-all band-aid even less promising.152 
As such, focusing first on smaller federal acts targeting some of 
the bigger gaps and outliers, like brick-and-mortar analytics 
technologies, could be one way to finally gain some traction.153 
Recent events, including a string of data breaches, the passage of 
strict privacy laws in Europe and California, and pressure from 
 
 147. See Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 6. 
 148. Kerry, supra note 71. 
 149. See generally Press Release, supra note 111. 
 150. Altshuler, supra note 4. 
 151. See sources cited supra note 13; David McCabe, Congress and Trump Agreed They Want a 
National Privacy Law. It Is Nowhere in Sight, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/technology/national-privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/L52M-
SVD2] (noting that back in 2019 in a “rare” moment, Republicans and Democrats in Congress were all 
in agreement that a national privacy law is warranted, but “a national privacy law is nowhere in sight”). 
 152. See Kerry, supra note 13. 
 153.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506. 
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consumers, have renewed interest in a federal privacy law and may 
have created the perfect incubator for its passage.154 
A. A Uniform Privacy Landscape 
Under current U.S. information privacy protections, neither 
consumers nor businesses are afforded any assurances in navigating 
today’s challenging and evolving privacy landscape.155 In response to 
delayed federal action, state governments are moving to pick up the 
privacy torch.156 Without some uniformity, however, movement on 
information privacy reform could crush companies doing business in 
more than one state and subject them to the effects of disparate and 
incomprehensible laws that could change each year.157 The price tag 
on California’s new privacy law has already been estimated at $55 
billion, and price tags like this across the United States could wreak 
havoc for businesses and risk the United States ceding its position as 
a technology leader.158 
High compliance costs from state laws would also impact 
businesses disparately. Instead of disrupting the concerning data 
practices of corporate giants like Facebook and Google, these 
burdens could actually be most detrimental for smaller businesses.159 
 
 154. Birnbaum, supra note 40 (noting efforts to develop a bipartisan federal privacy bill); Rich, supra 
note 68; Daniel R. Stoller & Ben Brody, New FTC Powers Weighed in Senate Data Privacy Hearing, 
BLOOMBERG L.: PRIV. & DATA SEC. L. NEWS (Feb. 27, 2019, 2:28 PM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/new-ftc-powers-weighed-in-senate-data-
privacy-hearing-1 [https://perma.cc/5KLT-NUSV]. 
 155. See Beckerman, supra note 57; Kerry & Chin, supra note 116. 
 156. Serrato et al., supra note 42. As of March 2018, all fifty U.S. states, as well as the District of 
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, have already enacted legislation to expand 
data breach notification rules, including an expanded definition of personal information, to mirror some 
of the protections the GDPR provides. Id.; Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (July 17, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/77FB-HUNC]. 
 157. Beckerman, supra note 57; see also Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 2 (explaining the 
significant effects on the economy likely to occur with the passage of just the CCPA). See generally 
Campbell et al., supra note 125. 
 158. Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 2 (asserting that “after a painful transition phase, the 
[CCPA] will cause long-term drag on innovation,” which should provide reason for pause given that 
“[t]he tech sector is the crown jewel of the U.S. economy”—it is “the greatest source of productivity 
growth, [and] it also produces jobs and raises wages faster than any other industry”); Feiner, supra note 
127; NRF Comment Letter, supra note 67; Beckerman, supra note 57. 
 159. See generally Ivana Kottasová, These Companies Are Getting Killed by GDPR, CNN: BUSINESS 
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In practice, these costs could force smaller businesses to close shop, 
wiping out the competition for and further concentrating personal 
information in the hands of the big players.160 “And even after a 
painful transition phase, [these laws] will cause long-term drag on 
innovation.”161 
This result is particularly irreconcilable given that the very 
consumers these laws serve to protect would also be victims of this 
patchwork of state laws. Because data protection would necessarily 
depend on the criteria chosen by the states to trigger compliance, 
personal data still would not be protected comprehensively.162 Thus, 
consumers would be given a false sense of security concerning the 
strength of privacy protections and encounter little legal certainty or 
predictability.163 
Additionally, consumers could also face increased costs as 
businesses shift these expenses onto their products and services. And 
because businesses might be less inclined to act in certain areas for 
fear of risking penalties, consumers would likely forfeit many of the 
conveniences and benefits they have come to expect thanks to 
innovative uses of data.164 As such, a uniform privacy landscape 
appears most beneficial for both consumers and businesses.165 
Although advocates fear that preempting state laws will dilute 
stronger consumer protections, preemption would apply only to 
inconsistent state laws confined to the limited context of 
 
(May 11, 2018, 6:39 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/11/technology/gdpr-tech-companies-
losers/index.html [https://perma.cc/6QN7-X92H] (describing the fatal impact of the cost of complying 
on smaller businesses in the context of the GDPR); Campbell et al., supra note 125, at 47; Feiner, supra 
note 127. 
 160. Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 2. See generally Kottasová, supra note 159; Campbell et 
al., supra note 125; Feiner, supra note 127. 
 161. Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 2. 
 162. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140 (West 2020) (denying protections to the data of nonprofits 
and businesses if those organizations have annual revenues under $25 million dollars or meet other 
similar criteria). 
 163. Beckerman, supra note 57. According to a Pew Research study, there is already a “general lack 
of understanding about data privacy laws” among consumers, with 63% stating that “they understand 
very little or nothing at all about the laws and regulations that are currently in place to protect their data 
privacy.” Auxier et al., supra note 19. 
 164. NRF Comment Letter, supra note 67. 
 165. See generally Beckerman, supra note 57. 
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brick-and-mortar.166 Further, a federal law could actually provide 
stronger, more comprehensive protections that eliminate gaps in state 
laws and issues with patchwork compliance.167 
B. A Targeted Brick-and-Mortar Technology Privacy Act 
Concern for brick-and-mortar is well-founded given retail’s 
importance to the U.S. economy with a gross domestic product 
contribution of around $3.9 trillion of the annual total of $21.43 
trillion.168 Despite all of the attention legislators and academics 
continue to give online privacy, online retail transactions constitute 
around only 11% of all U.S. retail sales—with brick-and-mortar 
controlling the rest, totaling approximately $3.38 trillion.169 Further, 
although online and brick-and-mortar retailers both seek to improve 
and personalize the shopping experience through analytics 
technologies, in practice information privacy laws that treat them the 
same could create very different outcomes for each.170 
Ambiguity and a hodgepodge of sweeping state information 
privacy laws have the propensity to suffocate the use of technologies 
 
 166. See, e.g., Cameron F. Kerry, A Federal Privacy Law Could Do Better Than California’s, 
BROOKINGS: TECHTANK (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/04/29/a-
federal-privacy-law-could-do-better-than-californias/ [https://perma.cc/P3C8-36K5] (noting how 
privacy advocates and California representatives in Congress feel the CCPA must be insulated from 
preemption); Privacy Preemption Watch, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/preemption/ 
[https://perma.cc/L5Q8-U24P] (advocating for a federal baseline law and arguing that preemption stops 
states from performing their traditional roles as “laboratories of democracy” (quoting New State Ice Co. 
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))). 
 167. Kerry, supra note 166. 
 168. Latest Study Shows Heightened Importance of Retail to the U.S. Economy, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N: 
ECON. (July 20, 2020) (citing NAT’L RETAIL FED’N & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE US RETAIL INDUSTRY (2020)), https://nrf.com/blog/latest-study-shows-
heightened-importance-retail-us-economy [https://perma.cc/8NX3-C5ZQ]; Gross Domestic Product, 
Fourth Quarter and Year 2019 (Advance Estimate), BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS (Jan. 30, 2020) 
[hereinafter GDP Q4 2019], https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/gross-domestic-product-fourth-quarter-
and-year-2019-advance-estimate [https://perma.cc/RS5T-UM2H]. 
 169. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 15; NRF Says ‘State of the Economy is Sound’ and 
Forecasts Retail Sales Will Grow Between 3.8 and 4.4 Percent, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N: ECON. (Feb. 5, 
2019) [hereinafter NRF Forecasts], https://nrf.com/media-center/press-releases/nrf-says-state-economy-
sound-and-forecasts-retail-sales-will-grow [https://perma.cc/6NX9-3CLH] (estimating retail sales at 
more than $3.8 trillion in 2019); see also State of Retail, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N: ECON., 
https://nrf.com/insights/economy/state-retail [https://perma.cc/WDJ6-WNLW] (“Of the top 50 online 
retailers, nearly all operate stores.”). 
 170. See discussion supra Sections II.A.2, II.B.1. 
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that often take years to develop and roll out across physical retail 
locations.171 Legacy infrastructures and the realities of operating at 
scale in a three-dimensional space require significant planning, 
engineering, manpower, and outlays of capital that could easily favor 
online over brick-and-mortar retail.172 As such, neither the bills and 
drafts introduced in the 116th Congress nor GDPR-, CCPA-, or 
CPRA-style laws adequately provide a clear path for developing and 
implementing in-store technology.173 Moreover, unlike the wealth of 
FTC settlements, likened to common law and available for online 
privacy, counsel in the brick-and-mortar context is noticeably absent 
and several questions remain unanswered.174 This is particularly 
problematic given that the risks and costs of innovation are 
significantly higher in brick-and-mortar than online—a 
miscalculation cannot be remedied with keystrokes and lines of 
code.175 
Additionally, because in-store analytics technologies are just 
beginning to gain traction, a targeted federal act will allow 
policymakers to get in front of information privacy issues.176 With 
some healthy guardrails, privacy regulation can grow alongside 
innovation. And a targeted federal act could serve as a testing and 
learning ground for privacy policy innovation for possible application 
across a myriad of other smart spaces on the horizon, such as smart 
cities, hotels, and factories.177 Further, rather than working with 
hundreds of different stakeholders across sectors on each move, 
policymakers would be able to narrow their focus to the retail sector, 
allowing for greater efficiency and a better chance of success. 
 
 171. See discussion supra Section II.A.2; see also NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 27–29 (showing the 
large differences between technological capabilities online and the three-dimensional store); NRF 
Comment Letter, supra note 67, at 5–6 (explaining that without some harmonization of regulatory laws, 
businesses may cease “their investment in technological innovations that would better serve 
consumers . . . out of fear of tripping over a hodge-podge of potentially conflicting . . . regulations”). 
 172. See discussion supra Section II.A.2; NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 29. 
 173. See discussion supra Sections II.A.2, II.B.1. 
 174. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 175. See discussion supra Section II.A.2; NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 29. 
 176. See SKORUPA, supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 177. Ganesan et al., supra note 6. 
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Findings from this act could then inform information privacy reform 
in other relevant sectors. 
Although a targeted act lends to a continuation of the sectoral 
approach generally disfavored by privacy advocates, it may be the 
best solution to address brick-and-mortar concerns because of its 
ability to take stock of contextual and informational norms relevant 
to the industry. This flexibility would allow for more transparent and 
comprehensive regulation, as it has already done for sectors like 
healthcare and finance.178 And it does not preclude an omnibus law 
later; a savings provision could simply preserve the act. 
C. More Business Accountability and FTC Enforcement 
To operate effectively, however, strong accountability and 
enforcement mechanisms will need to accompany any act. The 
current privacy regime is generally viewed as insufficient in this 
regard, yet with popular consumer control models, lawmakers appear 
to provide consumers with more of the same—“a horse in a 
self-driving car world.”179 At first blush, consumer control models 
appear to provide consumers with the greatest protections.180 In 
practice, however, they may do just the opposite because they 
continue to rely on broken consent models and place the 
responsibility of protecting privacy on consumers, despite 
recognizing that they are unfit for the task.181 
Moreover, simply mirroring a hastily passed CCPA at the expense 
of businesses will not provide consumers or businesses with a fair or 
adequate solution.182 To properly balance competing consumer and 
business interests, a federal privacy law should adopt more of a 
business accountability approach, shifting the burden of protecting 
privacy to the businesses, data brokers, and executives that hold 
 
 178. NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 238. 
 179. Polina Arsentyeva, It’s 2019, So Why Are We Still Talking About Opt-In Consent?, IAPP (Nov. 
12, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/its-2019-so-why-are-we-still-talking-about-opt-in-consent/ 
[https://perma.cc/QT69-LCJE]; see also discussion supra Section II.A. See generally Kerry & Chin, 
supra note 116. 
 180. See discussion supra Section II.B.1; see also Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 6. 
 181. See discussion supra Section II.B.1; Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 5–6. 
 182. See Wakabayashi, supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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consumer data, while using duties of care to allow flexibility and 
innovation to develop systems and processes that do not depend on 
intrusive surveillance.183 
To complement this shift, a federal regulator is also necessary to 
ensure that profit motives do not lead to blatant violations, like those 
by Facebook.184 Despite concerns that the FTC is not up to the task, 
no enforcement candidate seems better suited for the job.185 The 
reality is that the FTC’s legal authority over privacy is the same as it 
was before the internet.186 The FTC also remains “woefully 
understaffed in privacy, with some [forty] full-time staff 
members . . . dedicated to protecting the privacy of more than 320 
million Americans” and overseeing over 32 million businesses.187 In 
comparison, Britain has more than 700 staff members, and Ireland 
and Canada each have almost 150 staff members, despite the fact that 
both of these countries have smaller populations than the United 
States.188 
Yet, in spite of these constraints and limited resources, the FTC 
has earned itself the title of “de facto federal data protection 
authority,” and unlike any new agency, the FTC has decades of 
experience in handling privacy issues and appears willing to pursue 
the corporate giants.189 As such, the FTC could take on many more 
cases and step up to lead the U.S. privacy regulatory effort if properly 
 
 183. Kerry, supra note 166 (“The effectiveness of [exclusive focus on control] is becoming a mirage 
as the amount and pace of data collection keeps expanding. . . . Privacy experts widely believe that the 
law needs to shift the burden away from individuals and onto the businesses that collect personal 
information.”). 
 184. See generally Hoofnagle et al., supra note 49. 
 185. Id.; see also Rich, supra note 49. 
 186. See Rich, supra note 49 (noting that the FTC Act “was passed more than 100 years ago, long 
before personal computers, the internet, social media or mobile phones were invented” and is no longer 
enough to protect privacy). 
 187. Id.; Todd Kehoe, What Counts As a ‘Business’? It Might Not Be What You Think It Is, ALBANY 
BUS. REV.: DATA DROP (Apr. 11, 2019, 2:39 PM), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/albany/news/2019/04/11/number-of-businesses-in-the-united-states.html 
[https://perma.cc/AZ9F-Y6H8]. 
 188. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 49; Rich, supra note 49. 
 189. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 600; Hoofnagle et al., supra note 49 (noting that even with 
its severe limitations, the FTC has bolstered important norms, influenced company practices, and 
become a significant enforcement agency that the industry pays attention to); Rich, supra note 49 (“The 
F.T.C. has nevertheless built a strong privacy program . . . .”). 
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equipped to do so.190 Specifically, the FTC should be given greater 
resources and a staff more proportional to the population size it 
serves; enhanced enforcement authority, including the ability to 
impose civil fines for first-time violations; and limited power to 
interpret specific provisions by adopting rules.191 Although granting 
the FTC rulemaking authority has been criticized on account of 
alleged overreach in the past, the grant here would be limited, thus 
curtailing any such risk.192 
Despite this expansion of FTC powers, accountability among 
corporate titans will still demand more to ensure that the FTC is not 
simply chasing headlines with drop-in-the-bucket fines, as FTC 
Commissioner Rohit Chopra has already accused his fellow FTC 
commissioners of doing.193 To that end, some bills have sought to 
empower individuals with a PRA.194 However, although deputizing 
individuals as “private attorneys general” would certainly serve as an 
enforcement multiplier, this measure would again place the burden of 
enforcing privacy on consumers who would either be excluded by or 
forced to absorb the costs of litigation. Notably, a PRA could also 
bring a reform effort to an impasse.195 
 
 190. See generally Hoofnagle et al., supra note 49. 
 191. See generally Rich, supra note 49. 
 192. Propes, supra note 73. 
 193. Emily Birnbaum, FTC Dem: Regulators Are ‘Drinking the Kool-Aid’ of Monopolists, THE HILL 
(Nov. 14, 2019, 12:37 PM) (quoting FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra), 
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/470488-ftc-dem-worries-regulators-drinking-the-kool-aid-of-
monopolists [https://perma.cc/587J-MXXF]; see also Hoofnagle et al., supra note 49. 
 194. See Press Release, supra note 111; Kerry, supra note 71; Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, 
at 3 and accompanying text. 
 195. Birnbaum, supra note 40 (noting that a PRA is one of two issues that has stalled negotiations for 
months and pointing out that the House’s latest bipartisan federal draft bill has sidestepped the PRA 
issue to try to move forward). See generally Theodore F. Claypoole, Private Right of Action vs. 
Statutory Damages. Which Has More Impact?, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 2, 2019), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/private-right-action-vs-statutory-damages-which-has-more-
impact [https://perma.cc/R4BL-HBDL] (offering insight into one side of the PRA debate focused on 
concerns for nuisance lawsuits and class-actions, arguing that a PRA could lead to a slew of frivolous, 
resource-consuming lawsuits). But see generally Joseph Jerome, Private Right of Action Shouldn’t Be a 
Yes-No Proposition in Federal US Privacy Legislation, IAPP (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/private-right-of-action-shouldnt-be-a-yes-no-proposition-in-federal-privacy-
legislation/ [https://perma.cc/6APU-WVGU] (explaining that Congress and the courts have a huge say 
in how much litigation results, noting the benefits of a PRA, and arguing that if properly constructed, a 
PRA could advance privacy rights at the national level); Cameron F. Kerry & John B. Morris, In 
Privacy Legislation, a Private Right of Action Is Not an All-or-Nothing Proposition, BROOKINGS: 
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Instead, consumers might be better served by providing 
accountability and personal liability for corporate executives, 
empowering and appropriately staffing the FTC, and using state 
attorneys general as an enforcement backstop.196 Under the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), the FTC and 
state attorneys general have already proven that they can successfully 
share enforcement powers.197 Enforcement through these capable 
means would also provide consumers with consistent outcomes and 
provide a more robust process through which noncompliance could 
be steadily monitored and remedied.198 
D. Specific Brick-and-Mortar Considerations 
One-size-fits-all approaches provided in industry-neutral and 
channel-neutral provisions are unrealistic and “untethered to the 
realities of operating at scale” in the physical retail environment.199 
Instead, a uniform act could provide much-needed clarity for both the 
brick-and-mortar store and the consumer. Specific considerations 
should include: a fixed, narrow definition of PII; reasonable 
consumer control; a general duty of care; and enhanced notice via 
modern technology solutions. 
1. Fixed, Narrow Definition of PII 
PII is probably best described as a moving target; distinctions 
between PII and non-PII are not fixed and depend upon 
ever-changing technological capabilities to reidentify non-PII such 
that “today’s non-PII might be tomorrow’s PII.”200 Because of this 
malleable nature, broad definitions such as “linked or reasonably 
 
TECHTANK (July 7, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/07/07/in-privacy-legislation-
a-private-right-of-action-is-not-an-all-or-nothing-proposition/ [https://perma.cc/3W93-P2P6] 
(explaining that despite polar positions on a PRA, a PRA is not an all-or-nothing proposition and 
proposing a tiered substantive rights approach as a possible way forward). 
 196. See, e.g., USCDPA, supra note 69, at 20–22. 
 197. Stoller & Brody, supra note 154. 
 198. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ILL-SUITED: PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION AND 
PRIVACY CLAIMS 19 (July 2019). 
 199. See RILA Comment Letter, supra note 68, at 2. 
 200. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 36, at 1846. 
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linkable” are unclear and unfairly place all of the risk on 
brick-and-mortar businesses. Instead, a fixed, narrow definition of 
PII should be used to trigger the greatest business obligations based 
on truly sensitive, individually identifiable information linked to a 
real risk of significant harm.201 
As such, aggregated and de-identified information, for which a 
company has no reasonable basis to believe could be used to identify 
an individual, should be expressly excluded from this definition. A 
de-identification standard, which outlines permitted methods for 
achieving de-identification, could be used to prevent users from 
circumventing compliance.202 Further, as an additional consideration, 
PII could be classified regarding the specific context of 
brick-and-mortar data processing, rather than regarding generic 
determinations, which may not address relevant categories of 
information.203 
Although broader definitions of PII may better address 
technological advances, a catch-all, like “any other identifier that the 
FTC determines as identifiable,” could be added to the definition to 
account for this needed flexibility.204 Even with this addition, this 
fixed definition would create a clearer understanding of business 
obligations and consumer rights. It would also reduce compliance 
expenses stemming from broad definitions of PII and allow 
businesses the flexibility to continue innovating and serving 
consumers in expected and convenient ways. 
 
 201. See RILA Comment Letter, supra note 68, at 2. 
 202. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., GUIDANCE REGARDING METHODS FOR 
DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HEALTH 
INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA) PRIVACY RULE 6–9 (2015). Under 
HIPAA, there are two methods to achieve de-identification: (1) through expert determination and (2) 
through removal of a list of specified identifiers coupled with no actual knowledge that the information 
could be used to identify an individual who is a subject of the information. Id. at 7. 
 203. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 36, at 1847–48 (explaining that abstract determinations of 
PII are insufficient because the ability to identify information is driven by context, and providing 
explanatory examples); see also RILA Comment Letter, supra note 68, at 2 (making a similar 
argument). 
 204. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8)(F) (“The term ‘personal information’ means individually 
identifiable information about an individual collected online, including . . . any other identifier that the 
Commission determines permits the physical or online contacting of a specific individual . . . .”). Under 
this authority, the FTC has indeed acted to expand the definition of PII in COPPA. Schwartz & Solove, 
supra note 36, at 1835. 
41
Harripaul: Information Privacy
Published by Reading Room, 2021
1118 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
2. General Duty of Care 
Additionally, including a general duty of care—like some of the 
116th Congress drafts—could provide a second tier of protections for 
data that falls outside the definition of PII.205 This duty of care could 
include reasonable measures not to cause reasonably foreseeable 
harm during data collection and use; not to discriminate based on 
things like religion, sexual orientation, income, medical conditions, 
or political beliefs; to collect and retain only the minimum data 
necessary to carry out purposes reasonably expected in the 
relationship; and to use security practices proportional to the 
sensitivity of data. For example, a brick-and-mortar store capturing 
location data through mobile analytics should never be capturing full 
location trails extending outside the store, including details such as 
other places visited with timestamps, to construct a consumer’s daily 
journey.206 Even if this information was not captured within the 
definition of PII, this intrusive overreach would easily be captured 
under this duty of care. 
With respect to in-store analytics technologies, rather than 
arbitrarily excluding uncommon technologies, this narrow definition 
of PII and general duty of care properly allow for consideration of 
technology use in context.207 Brick-and-mortar stores are not 
prohibited from using less invasive technologies to gather invaluable 
survival metrics while still appreciating the consumer’s need for 
privacy. Anonymized video analytics, for example, which scan video 
frames to detect the presence of a face—but do not recognize a face 
individually and destroy the video after detection—offer a 
positive-sum, “win-win” solution that stores could use to capture 
 
 205. See Intel Legislation, supra note 70; Kerry, supra note 71. 
 206. See Jeff Glueck, Opinion, How to Stop the Abuse of Location Data, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/16/opinion/foursquare-privacy-internet.html [https://perma.cc/T6Z9-
V8U4]. 
 207. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 4, at 235. Helen Nissenbaum cautioned against applying moral 
categories to technologies without considering context. See id. (“What matters is not merely that a 
particular technical device or system is not overly unusual, but that its use in a particular context, in a 
particular way is not overly unusual.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Bambauer Statement, supra note 
110, at 4 (arguing against user control models because of the potential for “overprotection when 
consumers distrust a new data practice that is actually socially and even personally beneficial”). 
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many of the metrics discussed in Part I in a privacy-enhancing 
way.208 
3. Reasonable Consumer Control 
To further balance business practicality and burdens, a 
“reasonableness” limitation could also be placed on offered consumer 
rights. Despite political demand, GDPR- and CCPA-style models that 
attempt to give consumers full control of PII often paint an illusory 
picture for consumers or fail to actually serve consumer privacy 
interests.209 These models position privacy as something consumers 
can protect themselves against, but—even with best practices—the 
reality of engaging with most technology and participating in the 
digital economy means handing over data.210 Consumers can also 
quickly become inundated by obvious or seemingly insignificant 
choices and become less attentive to choices that are important to 
them.211 
 
 208. ANN CAVOUKIAN, INFO. & PRIV. COMM’R OF ONT., CAN., WHITE PAPER: ANONYMOUS VIDEO 
ANALYTICS (AVA) TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY 2–4 (2011), https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/ 
Resources/AVAwhite6.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TR6-36XF]. 
 209. Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 6; Kerry, supra note 71 (noting that although consumer 
control, namely greater transparency and individual decision-making, “ha[s] a place in comprehensive 
privacy legislation,” consumer control approaches “are far from sufficient in a digital environment in 
which control is so elusive”). 
 210. Altshuler, supra note 4; Kerry & Chin, supra note 116; Charlie Warzel, Opinion, Privacy Is Not 
Your Responsibility, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2019) (quoting Colin Horgan, Tech Isn’t Vulnerable—You 




 211. Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much 
of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 995, 996, 999 (2000) (first citing Ravi Dhar, 
Consumer Preference for a No-Choice Option, 24 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 215 (1997); then citing Eldar 
Shafir et al., Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11 (1993); then citing Eldar Shafir & Amos Tversky, 
Thinking Through Uncertainty: Nonconsequential Reasoning and Choice, 24 COGNITION 449 (1992); 
then citing John R. Hauser & Birger Wernerfelt, An Evaluation Cost Model of Consideration Sets, 16 J. 
CONSUMER RSCH. 393 (1990); then citing John W. Payne, Contingent Decision Behavior, 92 PSYCH. 
BULL. 382 (1982); then citing John W. Payne et al., Adaptive Strategy Selection in Decision Making, 14 
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 534 (1988); then citing JOHN W. PAYNE 
ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER (1993); then citing Danielle Timmermans, The Impact of Task 
Complexity on Information Use in Multi-Attribute Decision Making, 6 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 95 
(1993); and then citing Peter Wright, Consumer Choice Strategies: Simplifying vs. Optimizing, 12 J. 
MKTG. RSCH. 60 (1975)). 
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Full consumer control also presents a risk of burdening the digital 
economy with heavy transaction costs, despite little reason to think 
that compliance will have a meaningful relationship to mitigating 
consumer harms.212 Data portability provisions are illustrative of this 
point. Arming consumers with the option to move their data from one 
business to another does little to further privacy protection goals. 
Individual control is not the same as individual privacy.213 Moreover, 
it creates a substantial and unnecessary privacy risk.214 
As such, because data collection practices vary widely from one 
business to the next, decisions regarding which consumer rights to 
offer, when to offer them, and how they are offered should also 
depend on context. A privacy approach that evaluates these rights in 
context better addresses the unique needs and uses of data by brick-
and-mortar stores. Specifically concerning consent, to avoid consent 
fatigue, a more proportional risk-based concept of consent that 
requires explicit consent only where serious harm is threatened could 
offer a more practical solution in the context of the store environment 
and help make consumer choice more meaningful.215 
4. Notice Through 21st Century Technology 
Based on the bills and proposals before the 116th Congress, it is 
clear that notice or awareness continues to be a key concern.216 
However, lengthy and legalistic privacy policies are wholly 
ineffective in actually informing consumers of data practices, even if 
they do serve an accountability function for privacy watchdogs.217 
 
 212. Bambauer Statement, supra note 110, at 6. 
 213. Fred H. Cate, Protecting Privacy in Health Research: The Limits of Individual Choice, 98. 
CALIF. L. REV. 1765, 1801–02 (2010). 
 214. See PAVUR & KNERR, supra note 129. 
 215. Cate, supra note 213, at 1799 (recommending this kind of approach to reduce prohibitive 
restrictions on health research); see also Kerry, supra note 13 (noting that perhaps informed consent was 
practical two decades ago, but in a world with constant streams of digital interactions, today it “is a 
fantasy”). 
 216. See PAVUR & KNERR, supra note 129. 
 217. Kerry, supra note 71; see also Joseph Turow, Opinion, Let’s Retire the Phrase ‘Privacy Policy,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/opinion/20Turow.html 
[https://perma.cc/JN4B-WCMP] (noting that a majority of consumers actually interpret the mere 
presence of a privacy policy on a business’s website as an indication that it will not share the 
individual’s information with other websites or companies without the consumer’s permission). 
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Additionally, in the specific context of in-store analytics 
technologies, notices placed on websites or signs placed at store 
entrances can be problematic given that these technologies are 
largely invisible to consumers inside the store.218 
As an immediate solution for stores that also have an online 
presence, as regulators have done with the GDPR, a privacy policy 
template could be created to at least standardize how and what 
information is presented across websites.219 Additionally, because 
notice must serve the purpose of both informing consumers and 
acting as an accountability mechanism, creating a two-tiered system 
appears to offer a simple solution here.220 For regulators, a plain 
disclosure on data practices for consumers and periodic data 
protection reports certified by business executives could be 
required.221 For consumers, a short and simple notice on the 
business’s website with options to dive deeper and get more details 
on data practices could be required.222 Disclosures based on the 
information disclosed in executive certifications could also be 
communicated via a centralized consumer website using standardized 
icons, short explanatory videos, and privacy practice scores, much 
like restaurant health inspection scores.  
At the store level, in addition to a notice placed outside the store, 
businesses could also place notices at the shelf-level or at other 
relevant points within the store to drive further awareness. And, 
looking to the future, many of the same technologies used for 
tracking consumers could also be used to provide solutions to 
improve transparency. In one scenario, these devices could be 
 
 218. FitzGerald, supra note 6; Nguyen, supra note 10; WORLD ECON. F., REDESIGNING DATA 
PRIVACY: REIMAGINING NOTICE & CONSENT FOR HUMAN-TECHNOLOGY INTERACTION 7 (2020), 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/redesigning-data-privacy-reimagining-notice-consent-for-
humantechnology-interaction [https://perma.cc/BFV6-KM2X]. 
 219. See Our Company Privacy Policy, GEN. DATA PROT. REGUL., https://gdpr.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/Our-Company-Privacy-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8TA-WAS9]. 
 220. Kerry & Chin, supra note 116 (detailing the benefits and workings of a two-tiered approach). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See Brian Kint, Is It Time to Rethink Notice and Choice As a Fair Information Privacy 
Practice?, CYBER L. MONITOR (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.cyberlawmonitor.com/2019/02/13/is-it-
time-to-rethink-notice-and-choice-as-a-fair-information-privacy-practice/ [https://perma.cc/ZY35-
5KUD] (recommending a similar layered privacy notice and explaining how it would work). 
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required to “announce” the technology’s presence to consumers by 
broadcasting a standardized, continuous wireless signal when in use, 
which could be presented to consumers in a myriad of ways.223 For 
example, in dealing with video analytics, a standardized mobile 
application could sniff out these technologies and provide the 
consumer with a live view into shopper tracking technologies used 
within the store.224  
In dealing with mobile tracking solutions, open Wi-Fi or Bluetooth 
networks could also push a mobile alert to users of the existence of 
mobile tracking and allow these consumers to opt out.225 
Alternatively, a standardized privacy-enhancing app could allow 
users to automatically disable signal transmission when approaching 
these networks to avoid collection altogether.226 In another scenario, 
a consumer’s data collection and use preferences could be 
programmed into the consumer’s smartphone or wearable device, 
like a smartwatch, and used to communicate their privacy preferences 
to the tracking devices.227 
Although a technology-driven solution certainly presents several 
implementation challenges, the reality is that the complexity of 
today’s technological landscape and the widespread consumer 
adoption of smartphones and other technologies suggest that these 
ideas have come of age for advancing privacy outcomes.228 The 
communication norms of modern consumers are very different than 
the norms of consumers targeted by the 1980 FIPs and even the 
norms of consumers considered by the 116th Congress’s bills and 
resolutions.229 The question is, thus, whether Congress will delay the 
 
 223. Soltani, supra note 9 (suggesting that passive technology devices could automatically broadcast 
standardized, semicontinuous wireless signals that announce their presence as a technical solution to 
pervasive data collection in the public sphere). 
 224. Id.; see also Michael Grothaus, How to Find Hidden Cameras in Your Airbnb, and Anywhere 
Else, FAST CO. (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90331449/how-to-find-hidden-cameras-
in-your-airbnb-and-anywhere-else [https://perma.cc/JC7R-BHS2] (explaining how Wi-Fi sniffing apps 
can be used to detect smart devices when Airbnb owners secretly hide cameras in rooms). 
 225. Soltani, supra note 9. 
 226. Id. 
 227. WORLD ECON. F., supra note 218, at 22–23. 
 228. Id. at 24. 
 229. See Nehf, supra note 131, at 1733. 
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inevitable and make a difficult, eleventh-hour decision after 
industries and businesses are already established, or whether 
Congress will act now while brick-and-mortar technologies are still 
in the early phases of adoption and implementation, which would 
arguably be easier. Failures in reaching consumers with notice-and-
consent solutions have at least proven that moving forward, a new 
approach is necessary.230 If the problem is technology, perhaps 
technology could also offer the solution? 
CONCLUSION 
Large gaps in current information privacy regulation have left 
consumers and businesses alike unsure of the extent of privacy 
protections afforded.231 One sector of particular concern is the 
approximately $3.38 trillion brick-and-mortar retail industry and 
specifically its growing adoption of in-store analytics technologies.232 
Despite renewed interest in privacy reform, these efforts have 
focused largely on online information privacy, leaving many 
questions as to the fate of new and emerging brick-and-mortar 
technologies that mimic online tracking.233 Because these in-store 
analytics technologies are critical to helping traditional stores regain 
relevance among modern shoppers and compete against online 
competitors, there is a dire need to create a focused information 
privacy act.234 Otherwise, in-store analytics technologies could be 
swept up under broader online privacy reform and rendered obsolete. 
A targeted, uniform federal privacy act will ensure that consumers do 
not pay with their privacy and that brick-and-mortar stores secure a 
place in the future. 
 
 230. See id.; SENATE DEMOCRATS, supra note 70; Kerry, supra note 71; Developing the 
Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy, 83 Fed. Reg. 48,600, 48,601 (Sept. 26, 2018) 
(emphasizing that, to date, notice-and-choice mandates have resulted primarily in long, legal, 
regulator-focused privacy policies, only helping a small number of users). 
 231. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 232. See NRF Forecasts, supra note 169; GDP Q4 2019, supra note 168. 
 233. See discussion supra Sections II.A.1, II.A.2. 
 234. See discussion supra Part I. 
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